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FOREWORD BY THE DIRECTOR
I am delighted to present the fourth European
Union Organised Crime Threat Assessment
(2009 OCTA). The OCTA is a core product of the
intelligence-led law enforcement concept and
its drafting is one of Europol’s top priorities.
The OCTA is an assessment of current and
expected new trends in organised crime (OC)
impacting on the EU and its citizens. It is drawn
up in order to enable decision-makers to take
the appropriate action to counter the anticipat-
ed threat.
We continue to develop the methodology
involved in the OCTA process. Since 2005, when
the first steps along the path outlined by ‘The
Hague Programme’ were taken, Europol and the
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Member States (MS) have worked together to
improve the approach in analysing the OC phe-
nomenon.
The 2009 OCTA assesses the threat of OC in the
EU through the analysis of the organised crime
groups (OCGs), of the criminal markets, and of
their interaction within and without territorial
entities denominated as criminal hubs.
Through this 3-D perspective we assess that the
most significant criminal sectors are drug traf-
ficking, trafficking in human beings (THB), illegal
immigration, fraud, counterfeiting and money
laundering.
This report explores developments in each of
those areas and considers the impact of other
factors as well, such as criminal activities origi-
nating in the following external locations:
Western Africa, analysed in a dedicated chapter,
but also Belarus, the Middle East, Moldova,
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Western Balkans.
Many experts in EU Member States and other EU
agencies have helped Europol produce this
report. I am grateful for their contribution. I also
wish to thank our partners in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, the FYROM,
Israel, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Russia,
Switzerland, Turkey, the US and ICPO/Interpol,
for their co-operation. The novel approach
taken in producing this work has also seen con-
sultation with a number of partners from the
private sector and academia. Their co-operation
has added significant value to the OCTA.
Rob Wainwright
Director of Europol

1. INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION
In response to ‘The Hague Programme’, three
OCTA (2006, 2007 and 2008 OCTA) have been
produced and, combined with the ensuing
Council Conclusions, have already had a signifi-
cant impact on law enforcement throughout
Europe. This fourth OCTA represents another
important step forward in consolidating this
proactive and EU-wide approach in combatting
OC.
The 2009 OCTA aims to be a significant mile-
stone in the assessment of the OC threat, bring-
ing into the same context the structural and
functional features of the OC groups and the
dynamics of which they are part or that can be
exploited by them.
Such assessment is carried out with the aim of
identifying criminal ‘combinations’ that are
shaping the OC dynamics in the whole EU or sig-
nificant parts of it, so that the ensuing conclu-
sions are relevant beyond the borders of indi-
vidual Member States (MS) and complement pri-
orities based on national threat assessments.
This approach is reflected in the structure of the
OCTA.
First of all, criminal markets are briefly explored,
refraining from reiterating known situations in
full, and focusing instead on emerging issues
and new trends, with the aim of better outlining
the environment in which OC groups operate
and the opportunities that are or may be
exploited by them.
Then, the EU criminal hubs are described
through the assessment of their characteristics
and possible evolution, and through the analy-
sis of the interaction between OC groups and
criminal activities occuring within and among
the hubs.
Finally, the capabilities and intentions of OC
groups active in the EU are analysed. This analy-
sis derives from an evolved typology of OC
groups based on their features, strategies and
fields of action as reported by MS. This analysis
also contributes to the improvement of the
typology itself, thus initiating and perpetuating
a cycle, which is typical of intelligence activities.
Money laundering (ML) and important side
issues such as the criminal situation in West
Africa and the present economic crisis are treat-
ed in dedicated sections of the document, as
they request a special and asymmetric interest.
The OCTA is based on a multi-source approach,
including law enforcement and non-law
enforcement contributions. It helps to close the
gap between strategic findings and operational
activities but, in suggesting strategic priorities, it
is not intended to be so detailed as to pinpoint
specific criminal investigations.
The OCTA is always being enhanced.
Methodological questions and other issues are
continuously being addressed in close co-oper-
ation with the Member States. The methodology
and procedures for its completion have been
amended, and this has had a positive result in
terms of quality of the contributions submitted
to the report and the way in which the contribu-
tions are analysed. Overall, the changes which
have been introduced have all contributed to
enhancing the quality of the OCTA.
The OCTA does not cover terrorism or terrorist
networks.
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The OCTA is a core element of the European
Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM), which is
based upon the intelligence-led law enforce-
ment concept. This means that the OCTA focus
is primarily placed on the OC groups.
Criminal activities are mainly analysed through
the criminal hubs concept. In this way, the focus
remains on complex situations that have wide-
spread effects reaching beyond national bor-
ders and shaping criminal markets in large parts
of the EU. Such complex situations are based on
considerations which appreciate criminal activi-
ties in terms of geographical flows and facilitat-
ing factors, and OCGs in terms of intentions and
capabilities (assessed through the typology).
Criminal hubs
The analysis of available information confirms
the existence of five criminal hubs with a wide
influence on criminal market dynamics in the
EU.
13
OCTA
2009
Dubai. The latter is a key financial and business
centre but also a logistical hub where OCGs
make contacts and deals, launder illicit pro-
ceeds and regulate shipments to transit or des-
tination markets. Indications of the growing
role of Pakistan in the international trade in opi-
ates (including processing in heroin) raise the
possibility that this country will intensify its role
as feeder, not only for the British Isles but also
for the European market as a whole.
The North West criminal hub’s geographical
centre is in the Netherlands and Belgium. Its
role as a distribution centre for heroin, cocaine,
synthetic drugs and cannabis products will per-
sist. Its influence extends to the UK, Ireland,
France, Spain, Germany and the Baltic and
Scandinavian countries. Several OCGs active in
the North West hub in order to obtain supplies
of illicit goods but based in another MS will
maintain their activities.
The North West criminal hub appears also to be
influenced by a feeder possibly located in the
Middle East, more specifically formed around
The South West criminal hub is traditionally
formed around the Iberian Peninsula and its
role as a South-West gateway to the EU. The
impact of this hub is felt especially in the crimi-
nal markets of cocaine, cannabis, trafficking in
human beings and illegal immigration.
West and North West Africa as well as other
parts of this continent have emerged as signifi-
cant feeders for either the South West criminal
hub or, increasingly, directly to important mar-
kets and distribution centres in the
Netherlands, France and elsewhere. Intelligence
leads to the hypothesis that the abuse of West
and Central Africa in the international drugs
business will both increase, expand (comprise
new countries) and deepen (not only storage
and transit but also processing, trading and/or
production).
The North East hub is and will continue being
strongly influenced by feeders and transit
zones located just outside the eastern EU bor-
ders (the Russian Federation/Kaliningrad, the
Ukraine and Belarus). Illicit flows may be traced
from the East towards the West (women for sex-
OCTA
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ual exploitation, illegal immigrants, cigarettes,
counterfeit goods, synthetic drugs precursors
and heroin) but also vice versa (cocaine and
cannabis products).
St Petersburg is an important logistical nexus,
feeding the North East hub. It ammasses vari-
ous commodities, which are then re-directed to
the Russian, Nordic, Baltic and Western
European markets. Kaliningrad appears to have
a similar but more limited role, especially in
relation to cigarette smuggling and importa-
tion of heroin into the EU.
The Southern criminal hub is shaped by the
central role of certain OCGs based in Italy that
are capable of developing important synergies
with OCGs based outside the EU. The latter
keep a subordinate position in this co-opera-
tive dynamic, while remitting their criminal pro-
ceeds to third countries where they are based,
and where other - more impacting - strategies
can be adopted.
The influence of the Southern hub is mostly felt
in the criminal markets of trafficking of cocaine
and cannabis products, illegal immigration,
smuggling of counterfeit goods and genuine
and counterfeit cigarettes, and the production
and distribution of counterfeit Euros.
The South East criminal hub is based upon its
geographical location between Asia and
Europe, and hinges on its role as an important
gateway to the EU. Logistically, the importance
of the Black Sea and the related waterways
define the hub and will create opportunities for
both legal trade and organised crime.
Romania can be seen as a significant gateway
for the facilitation of illegal immigration into
the EU, while the role of Bulgaria in certain
criminal markets such as synthetic drugs, coun-
terfeit Euros and payment card fraud is also
central.
The South East criminal hub is very active in
both producing various commodities and act-
ing as a busy transit, warehousing and re-pack-
aging zone. There are at least three main feed-
ers and relevant routes directly influencing the
South East criminal hub: North (the Ukraine and
Moldova), Centre (Western Balkans) and South
(Turkey).
The significance of the port of Constanta in the
cocaine traffic is growing, and cocaine seems to
be increasingly arriving in the EU through
Turkey and/or the Balkans. This may be due to
the increased involvement of Turkish and eth-
nic Albanian groups in the cocaine distribution
chain, but may also be the effect of the already
well-established role of West Africa as a transit
zone.
OC groups: typology
A key outcome of the 2009 OCTA is the OCG
typology.
In concrete terms, OCGs in this OCTA typology
are classified on the basis of the geographical
location of their strategic centre of interest and
their capability and intention:
■ To use systematic violence or intimidation
against local societies to ensure non-occa-
sional compliance or avoid interferences
(named VI-SO strategy).
A significant threat is represented by OCGs
adopting a strategy based on Violence –
Territory – Brand. Indications of the adop-
tion of that strategy are reported by several
MS. The threat from these OCGs is made
worse by the fact that they can serve to
channel in the wrong direction people who
feel alienated from mainstream society.
Easy supply of illicit goods may be one of
the reasons for the important role played in
certain countries by OCGs that engage in
systematic violence or intimidation against
local societies. This can be because the hubs
increase the importance of controlling the
destination markets. OCGs no longer need
to engage in laboriously building up com-
plex supply networks from other continents
because illicit goods are within easy reach
in nearby hubs. This violent behaviour is an
efficient means of obtaining control of a
destination market, so these OCGs have a
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significant potential for growth, enhanced
by the fact that a brand-name can be fran-
chised to other criminals, generating a win-
win situation for the franchiser OCGs and
the OCG accepting affiliation.
■ To interfere with law enforcement and judi-
cial processes by means of corruptive influ-
ence (named IN-LE strategy) or violen-
ce/intimidation (named VI-LE strategy).
OCGs can also adopt strategies that consist
of interfering significantly with law enforce-
ment or judicial processes. A peculiar
aggressive behaviour is mentioned, namely
false accusations against law enforcement
personnel.
■ To influence societies and economies
(named IN-SO strategy);
Indications suggesting the presence of
OCGs with the capability of having a signifi-
cant impact on local societies and
economies through corruptive influence,
infiltration or relevant re-investments of
criminal proceeds are reported in many MS,
so they can be considered an EU-wide
threat. There is also some suggestion that
certain OCGs based outside the EU adopt
strategies based on significant influence on
their local societies or economies.
Direct impact may be confined to specific
communities that are not integrated with
the surrounding society. These persons are
more vulnerable to OC, and this is some-
thing on which OC capitalises. Labour
exploitation can be a factor contributing to
this strategy. The need in the EU for new
work forces in various work areas which
require hard manual labour, and indications
of trafficking for forced labour, must be
assessed with due consideration for the
potential they give to the growth of this
type of OCG.
OC groups: assessment
The mechanisms of the Western criminal hubs
appear to be characterised by non-EU based
OCGs interacting with OCGs focused on eluding
law enforcement attention and based in the
geographical core of the hubs and, either direct-
ly or through them, with OCGs based in other
MS. The latter are active also in the geographical
core of the hub where they come for the pur-
pose of obtaining supplies.
This implies that the key OCGs in this scenario
will keep a low profile and focus on their lucra-
tive criminal businesses rather than engaging in
a struggle for control of territory. Visibility is for
them a matter of extreme concern. As a corol-
lary, sophisticated money laundering activities
are vitally important.
These OCGs pose a double-sided threat. In the
event that they succeed in re-investing their
criminal proceeds in the MS or third countries
where they are based, they can silently establish
their influence on local societies and eco-
nomies, further strengthening their resistance
to attempts to dismantle them. In the EU desti-
nation markets, meanwhile, they can facilitate
the growth of other types of OCGs, such as
those that engage in systematic violence or
intimidation against local societies.
The Southern criminal hub revolves around the
central role of certain mafia-type OCGs based in
Italy and clearly pursuing strategies based on
both systematic violence/ intimidation and
influence on local societies and economies.
With specific reference to the North East hub, it
can be noted that basically all OCGs active in
the Baltic countries are based there. The limited
potential of these destination markets com-
bined with the structural and functional fea-
tures of these OCGs are likely reasons for this.
This may also be an effect of the Western crimi-
nal hubs: supplying OCGs can deliver to these
hubs, while other OCGs based in the relevant
destination markets, or in this case in the North
East hub, will activate to take care of the next
steps in the distribution chain.
OCGs based in Latvia and pursuing strategies
based on eluding law enforcement attention, or
on interfering with law enforcement or judicial
When an OCG does not rely on any of the above
mentioned behaviours and focuses on eluding
law enforcement attention, it is considered as
having an EL-LE profile.
processes through corruptive influence, appear
to play a crucial intermediary role between the
Russian and the EU OC environment. In Estonia a
rising significance of OCGs focused on eluding
law enforcement attention can be inferred, at
least with reference to OCGs targeting other MS.
The types of OCGs based in Lithuania and playing
an important role in the dynamics of the North
East criminal hub are quite different. There is a
dominance of multi-crime oriented clusters,
where suggestions concerning combinations of
systematic violence, influence on local societies
and interference in the law enforcement and
judicial processes regularly emerge. Their partici-
pation in the hub’s dynamics appears to draw
more on their capability of being criminally
present in Western EU and on their structural and
functional profiles. Links with the Russian OC
markets are crucial and can be facilitated by
Latvian OC or go via the Kaliningrad region.
This puts the North East hub in an intermediate
position between the Western hubs – that can be
defined as ‘activity-based’ – and the Southern
hub – that can be defined as ‘OCG-based’. This is
at the basis of their coexistence and interrelation.
The emergence and strengthening of the Near
and Middle East drug markets, especially in rela-
tion to cocaine, synthetic drugs and precursors
for heroin, is also having a strong impact on the
dynamics of the South East criminal hub. The
key strategic role of Turkish OC groups who
exchange, for different markets, heroin for
cocaine, cannabis products, certain precursors
and synthetic drugs will grow. Partly through
the Turkish connection, the South East criminal
hub may expand its influence towards the
Middle East and certain parts of Asia (for exam-
ple Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Georgia
and Armenia).
Eastern Europe criminal scenarios suggest a
noticeable presence of OCGs pursuing strategies
based on influence on local societies and
economies, or interference in the law enforce-
ment and judicial processes through corruptive
influence. Such strategies are not confined to
OCGs composed of indigenous criminals. In
comparison with other Eastern European coun-
tries, the use of violence or intimidation seems to
be more frequent in Poland – where there are
indications suggesting that interference in the
law enforcement and judicial processes through
violence might emerge more often – and
Hungary – where there are indications suggesting
the possible use of systematic violence or intimi-
dation against local societies by several OCGs.
OC and West Africa
West Africa is considered to be highly influen-
tial in relation to the OC situation in the EU.
Morocco maintains its influential role as a major
source country for cannabis. For cocaine traf-
ficking, it principally acts as a transit zone
between Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe. As a
transit zone in the trafficking of all kinds of ille-
gal commodities to the Iberian Peninsula, this
region has also been highlighted in relation to
the trade in precursors and counterfeit tobacco.
Morocco is also targeted as a distribution mar-
ket for counterfeit Euro banknotes supplied by
EU OCGs active in the Southern criminal hub.
THB from Morocco is primarily organised for the
purpose of labour exploitation in the EU South
West region. It is expected that OCGs originating
from this area will not significantly progress
beyond the roles they currently occupy as mar-
ket coordinators for cannabis, and facilitators in
illegal immigration and cocaine trafficking
towards the EU Southern regions.
The Gulf of Guinea currently enjoys a highly
influential role as a logistics centre for cocaine
from South America destined for the European
market. It also serves as a major source in sup-
plying the EU regions with victims of THB for the
purpose of sexual exploitation. Indigenous OCGs
from this region, in particular of Nigerian origin,
maintain a position of influence within the wider
criminal landscape by interlinking OC activities
in West Africa and Europe. Without a significant
reduction in the vulnerability of legitimate sys-
tems in the West African countries, the long
term threat of WA OCGs is expected to stem
from the varied OC activities they are engaged
in and the systems they maintain for interlinking
activities at home and within the EU.
The activities of OCGs in the area approximat-
ing the Gulf of Guinea, combined with existing
facilitating factors, permit to envisage the actu-
al existence or future formation of a West
African criminal hub.
OCTA
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3. EU CRIMINAL MARKETS
3.1 Drug Trafficking
Heroin trafficking continues to be fed by large
scale opium cultivation in Afghanistan. Opiates
reach Europe through the Balkan routes and the
Northern Black Sea route across Central Asia and
Russia. Alternative routes, established trading
infrastructures, and geographical proximity to
source or destination countries are among the
main influencing factors of heroin trafficking.
The relevant role of Turkish, Kurdish, Pakistani
and Iranian OC groups is due to their geograph-
ical and historical proximity to the main source
country.
Cocaine is produced in the Andean region in
South America. The importance of West Africa
with regard to cocaine transit, storage and redis-
tribution is increasing. Its geographical position
between Andean cocaine suppliers and EU buy-
ers, combined with economic vulnerabilities,
established criminal networks and widespread
corruption are decisive facilitating factors for
international drug traffickers. South American
OC groups dominate wholesale international
trafficking. West African and domestic OC
groups manage secondary distribution within
EU. Cocaine enters the European market also
through Turkey. Middle East consumers and
domestic demand can explain this detour.
Morocco is still the main EU supplier of
cannabis resin. Cooperation of Moroccan OC
groups with domestic criminals assures knowl-
edge of legislation gaps and provides local con-
tacts. The increasing trend of indoor cannabis
plantations in MS can be due to geographical
proximity to the destination or distribution mar-
kets. Victims of THB or illegal immigrants repay-
ing the costs of their journey are often exploited
in cannabis plantations. Vietnamese growers are
widely reported. In countries with large num-
bers of cannabis users domestic production is
increasing to meet the demand and optimise
the profits. In the UK 80 per cent of cannabis is
thought to be produced domestically.
Inexpensive production, high profits and low
levels of specialisation characterise synthetic
drugs trafficking. Production and consumption
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areas seem to coincide or be adjacent, con-
tributing to abating costs and transportation
risks. Production in Eastern European countries
is increasing, although Dutch and Belgian OC
groups are still dominant. The production and
diversion of precursor chemicals is vital for the
trade. Chinese OC groups, dominant in the trade,
have ceased to use traditional routes: there has,
however, been no decline in the amount of
chemicals seized, suggesting that these OCGs
have found new routes as yet unidentified by
the authorities. Amphetamine production is sig-
nificantly increasing in Bulgaria and Turkey, also
destined towards the Middle East market.
Methamphetamine production is increasing, as
well as that of designer drugs produced by
Dutch and Belgian OC groups expanding their
markets. The growing industrial productivity
and penetration into the global market by China
and India, combined with licit access to precur-
sor chemicals, is reflected in a noticeable
increase in the production of synthetic drugs in
these countries.
Technology is a key facilitating factor in drug
trafficking. Special equipment for production,
anonymous internet communication, electronic
money transfers, online trade challenge both
international and national anti-drug policies and
control mechanisms. Industrial development
allows for the production of new, as yet uncon-
trolled substances or for the camouflage of more
traditional substances. The prison system pro-
vides an opportunity to meet associates, to
exchange information, to delegate tasks or to set
up new criminal connections. Social tolerance
and alluring media coverage contribute to miti-
gate inhibitions and increase consumption.
3.2 Crimes against Persons
Defining crimes against persons, it is impor-
tant to distinguish trafficking in human beings
(THB) from facilitated illegal immigration (peo-
ple smuggling). While people smuggling refers
to the facilitation of the illegal entry into the EU
OCTA
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of willing migrants, trafficking in human beings
is defined by their ensuing exploitation and
forced labour.
The most active OC groups involved in traffick-
ing human beings in the EU are  Bulgarian,
Nigerian and Romanian . Groups from other
Balkan countries, China, Moldova, Russia, Turkey,
Ukraine and Vietnam are also frequently report-
ed. Albanian OC groups tend to exploit victims
trafficked by other groups. Trafficking of women
for sexual exploitation is stabilising, while traf-
ficking for forced labour is increasing, mainly in
the sectors of construction, drug production
and begging. Intelligence indicates increasing
trafficking in children destined for illegal labour
– including domestic slavery – or sexual
exploitation. Romanian OC groups of Roma eth-
nicity dominate trafficking in children. Where
child victims have been identified it has been
observed that their willingness to cooperate
with the authorities is almost non existent.
Reports of child victims exhibiting non-cooper-
ative behaviour and taking every opportunity to
escape from ‘protective custody’ indicates the
level of control exercised by their traffickers. It is
also suspected that the use of children has been
determined as a strategy by the traffickers to
disrupt the law enforcement response. Possible
future sources of trafficked human beings
include Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian
countries (e.g. Georgia and Kyrgyzstan), whose
present threat is not clear.
Africa, Asia (China, Indian sub-continent and
Vietnam ), Eastern Europe (including FSU coun-
tries), Latin America, the Middle East and the
Western Balkans are sources of illegal immi-
grants toward the EU. Profiling smugglers, many
countries suggest that their nationality often
approximates to that of those smuggled,
although criminal partnership involving a wider
range of OC groups can not be excluded. Certain
transit countries are evolving into final destina-
tions. Inconsistent immigration laws and nation-
al anomalies in the Schengen visa policy facili-
tate this criminal activity.
In relation to THB and people smuggling, the
abuse of legal migration systems is likely to
increase in the future, especially in the area of
visa and residence permits. Also, intra-EU free-
dom of movement can be abused by OC groups,
as in the case of Eastern European EU citizens
exploited as prostitutes in Western Europe.
Criminals can legally move, and other migrants
flowing in significant numbers to MS can be
exploited or enlisted by OC groups.
Document counterfeiting and the abuse of the
transport sector, mainly low cost airlines, are
major facilitating factors in crimes against per-
sons. Traffickers are often involved in other
transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking,
payment card fraud, identity fraud, counterfeit-
ing and money laundering.
In recent years a considerable transnational
action has been directed against the production
and distribution of child abuse material on the
Internet. However the circulation of such materi-
al is not decreasing. OCGs are engaged in the
production of new illegal images and movies, or
they utilise the same material on different web-
sites where they sell it through sophisticated
electronic payment systems. Growing demand
implies an increasing number of children being
sexually abused to fulfill it.
Child abuse content is also distributed through
networks of child sex offenders that are not
motivated by financial gain. Rather, they
exchange this material because of their com-
mon sexual interest in children. Among the lat-
ter it has been noted that a large amount of ille-
gal material is being produced and distributed
by travelling sex offenders.
3.3 Fraud
Fraud is a worldwide problem and is a method
increasingly used to generate money in order to
fund other types of crime such as drug traffick-
ing, THB, identity fraud, alcohol smuggling,
counterfeiting and terrorism.
Value-added tax fraud (VAT fraud) is among the
most frequent types of trade fraud. Double
invoicing, illegal trade of goods without enlist-
ment of consumer tax and VAT, fictitious trade
with goods with consequent request of VAT
return, false invoicing and carousel fraud are fre-
quent scenarios. Disguising merging of legal
and illegal business activities plays a key role.
Catering services, transport, real estate agen-
cies, trade in mobile phones, computer parts,
fuel or cars are the most targeted businesses.
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Geographic proximity to trading countries, close
relations with former colonies, trade conditions,
national and international legislative anomalies
and the involvement of foreigners with legal
status in the EU facilitate this crime. Besides
domestic criminals, also African, Arab, Asian and
Russian OC groups are active in VAT fraud. Long
term residence in host countries, good knowl-
edge of the legal and tax systems, a background
in financial crime and active orientation towards
running business enterprises are typical fea-
tures of suspects. The activities of Russian OC
groups, for example, have been observed in the
Baltic region, while Chinese OC groups play an
important role in the South-East region, in coop-
eration with domestic criminals. Importing
goods into the EU through that traditional gate-
way, criminals invoice imported commodities to
missing traders and then divert them elsewhere.
The use of false commercial documentation
suggesting legitimate trade and masking details
of the trading process is a known facilitating
factor.
Public procurement fraud is usually linked
with elements of corruptive action against pub-
lic administration and the private business sec-
tor. OC groups can exploit this process from its
initial stages, tampering with the activities that
precede the publications of tenders, and thus
designing them to their advantage. Public and
community funds received illegally can be laun-
dered and re-integrated into the cycle of lawful
activities or be re-invested to support other
criminal activities.
Payment card fraud depends on the theft of
personal financial data through a wide range of
techniques, including wire tapping, hacking into
electronic databases, phishing, pharming and
skimming. It is not always necessary to copy
card data to a counterfeit card or white plastic
as illegal use of payment cards includes card-
not-present purchases. While carding is con-
trolled predominantly by Russian OC groups,
Romanian and Bulgarian OC groups prefer tradi-
tional skimming activities. The Modus Operandi
has changed slightly in 2008, as criminals are
moving from automated-teller machines (ATM)
to points of sale (POS) in hypermarkets and
shops to obtain payment card data: in addition,
while in the past skimming and money with-
drawals took place within the EU, criminals are
increasingly making withdrawals outside of the
EU, New GSM technology offers the opportuni-
ty to send data to other countries and dump
credit card data onto servers which are directly
accessible via the internet.
Fraud is not the only criminal field heavily
impacted upon by the rapid development of
modern technology. One of the emerging
threats is the growing number of virtual OC
groups. Criminals from different continents can
meet on the Internet and collaborate in crime
without personally knowing each other.
Common criminal intent and technical profi-
ciency are the driving factors of these virtual OC
groups, which get together on Virtual Private
Networks covering vast geographical areas. In
such private networks, always protected by
sophisticated security features, criminals or scat-
tered cells spread all over the world can meet
and organise to commit crimes on the internet;
specialists can offer their skills and be purposely
hired and paid by OC groups to commit crimes
on the internet (or in real life); individual crimi-
nals can meet and group to exchange illicit
material, for example child abuse pictures or
movies. OC groups operating on the Internet are
very difficult to trace. This is because there are
legal and procedural deficiencies in a number of
key areas, such as a common reporting system; a
reporting system for the victims; the managing
of and access to data retained by Internet
Service Providers (ISP) and telecommunication
companies; and a common strategy at interna-
tional level.
3.4 Counterfeiting
The manufacturing and distribution of counter-
feit commodities constitute a serious problem
beyond the financial loss of owners of intellec-
tual property rights and legal enterprises in
general. The industrial sectors mostly affected
by counterfeiting are music, software, tobacco
products, automotive parts, pharmaceutical and
chemical products, and clothing.
Pharmaceutical products, mainly those from
China, Hong Kong, India, Thailand and Turkey
represent the most alarming dimensions of this
phenomenon. To maximise profits, OC groups
produce medicines without regard to ingredi-
ents – including the active principle – composi-
tion and production methods. Other counterfeit
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products such as software, music, movies and
luxury goods lead to significant financial losses
to right holders and legitimate business. Modi
operandi vary in accordance with the selected
distribution channel. While some counterfeits
enter the legitimate supply chains and displace
the sale of genuine articles, causing a reduction
in revenue, some others are sold to end users
through illicit supply chains. Counterfeit prod-
ucts with labels and logos of renowned trade-
marks are also commercialised through door-to-
door sale. Some restaurants and other catering
services are involved in the import and distribu-
tion of counterfeit food and spirits. The growing
consumerism of society, combined with social
tolerance and a general lack of community
awareness are major facilitating factors. The sale
of counterfeits is directly linked to other crimi-
nal markets, such as drug trafficking, cigarette
smuggling, tax fraud and money laundering or
funds other criminal activities, such as illegal
migration, stolen vehicle trafficking or terrorism.
Counterfeited documents are a horizontal
facilitator touching upon all criminal markets.
Identity documents, passports, birth certificates,
and residence permits are among the most
commonly targeted documents ensuring
smooth perpetration of cross border organised
crime. Counterfeit customs declarations and
quality certificates are presented to custom
offices while declaring contents of shipments.
Counterfeit breeding documents are submitted
to MS consulates to obtain visas. Technology
development allows manufacturing counterfeit
products of higher quality, which makes their
detection and seizure more difficult and leads to
a larger profit for OC groups. The Internet, with
its virtual stores selling all kinds of goods, is one
of the main distribution channels for counter-
feits.
In 2008 for the first time the amount of coun-
terfeit Euro banknotes detected in circulation
amounted to more than 600,000 items
(664,000). This increase in fact intensified in the
second half of the year.
National authorities, often supported by
Europol, seized approximately 500,000 counter-
feit euro banknotes, arresting nearly 400 sus-
pects. A criminal profit of EUR 34 million was
prevented with the seizures.
An increase of Euro counterfeits, mainly of high
nominal value, is reported from the Balkans
together with Italian counterfeits of lower nom-
inal value. The criminals most frequently
involved in Euro counterfeiting come from
Bulgaria, some of Turkish origin, Colombia, Italy
and Lithuania. Counterfeit Euros produced in
Italy are also distributed in the EU by Ghanaian
OCGs and in Morocco, conceivably by Moroccan
OCGs. The black market contributes to the flow
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of counterfeits. The skilled use of sophisticated
equipment, computers and reproduction tech-
nology contribute to this increase. Low aware-
ness of and insufficient attention to security fea-
tures applied on banknotes facilitates the
process.
The decrease in the number of counterfeit class-
es being produced and the increase in the num-
ber of variants indicate a trend of further profes-
sionalism and the growing involvement of OC
groups. Thus a limited number of criminal
groups – mainly from the above mentioned
areas – are dominating this criminal market.
Another trend can be noticed in the counterfeit-
ed denominations. Historically, the EUR 50 has
been the most counterfeited banknote, but cur-
rent trends favor the EUR 20. The three mid-
range denominations (EUR 20, EUR 50 and EUR
100) together account for about 94 per cent of
all counterfeits.
An increasing number of counterfeit Euro coins
enter the market through slot-machines. The
improving quality of counterfeit coins indicates
the involvement of professionals from the cast-
ing industry in the production of raw materials
placed both in and outside the EU.
Euro counterfeiting is often associated with
other crime areas such as drug trafficking,
money laundering and economic crimes.
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4. ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL HUBS
4.1 Criminal hubs
A ‘criminal hub’ is a conceptual entity that is
generated by a combination of factors such as
proximity to major destination markets, geo-
graphic location, infrastructure, types of OC
groups and migration processes concerning key
criminals or OC groups in general. A criminal
hub receives flows from a number of sources
and spreads their effects in the EU thereby forg-
ing criminal markets and creating opportunities
for the growth of OC groups that are able to
profit from these dynamics.
The criminal hubs do not exist by or for them-
selves. They are supplied by so-called feeders
which are often locations just inside or outside
the EU borders providing goods to the impor-
tant European hubs, namely the North-West,
North-East, South-West, South-East and
Southern criminal hubs. The feeders can have
different roles: in some cases they are relatively
passive transit zones to the EU, in other occa-
sions they are active centres in which business
deals on commodities are negotiated, logistics
defined, goods stored and re-packaged, and
strategies for the delivery of the goods defined
and agreed. In any case the role of the feeders is
crucial: they procure and move goods from the
origin closer to the EU and in some cases even
alter or finalise the commodities in preparation
for their various stages of final distribution in
the EU and Europe.
The relationship between the various levels of
hubs and feeders can be illustrated by the
example of cocaine trafficking into the EU.
Cocaine is produced not only in Colombia but in
Peru and Bolivia and possibly other Latin
American countries. This diversion is mainly due
to law enforcement action in Colombia and
international political pressures against the
country’s significant role in coca production.The
cultivation is in any case organised and con-
trolled mainly by Colombian groups.
From its origin cocaine is moved either to
Venezuela and Brazil, whose role in cocaine tran-
sit is increasing, or to the Caribbean or Central
America (Mexico, Costa Rica and Panama) in
order to circumvent law enforcement action
based on specific risk origin countries in the EU
airports and sea ports. West Africa and recently
also certain other African regions are used for
transferring cocaine to the EU and elsewhere.
The Balkans, the Black Sea region including
Turkey and especially the port of Constanta are
also receiving flows of cocaine which are then
fed towards Western Europe.
In Europe the cocaine directed through the
feeders in many cases arrives in the South West
criminal hub to be forwarded, to a certain
extent, to other hubs such as the North West. In
this framework, the latter can be considered a
secondary distribution hub. From there the
cocaine is re-directed to its final destination
markets all over the EU. Alternatively criminal
groups can procure cocaine directly from the
origin or indirectly from the feeders. This is done
in order to cut costs or to fulfil a certain distri-
bution role in a specific market. Certain Latvian
and Lithuanian OC groups are strengthening
their position in the cocaine market by directing
cocaine couriers from the origin via the Baltic
States for the growing Russian market. In addi-
tion to this, cocaine is exchanged for other
drugs and commodities: in Turkey and Iran for
heroin, in Spain for cannabis products and in the
Russian Federation for arms.
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On the whole the gateways to the EU remain rel-
atively stable but the transit areas and com-
modities vary, as may also the direction of the
routes. These variations are the visible indica-
tions of the changes taking place in the criminal
hubs which are the dynamic centres of criminal
activities and in turn respond to changes in
demand. An indication of this is the increasing
association between ethnic Albanian groups
and the Balkans and Turkey – which previously
have mainly been associated with heroin traf-
ficking – in the cocaine trade. For various rea-
sons the demand for cocaine in some parts of
the EU as well as the Russian Federation seems
to be growing while heroin use remains stable.
This can change the supply patterns relatively
quickly, especially with those OC groups that
can logistically and organisationally respond to
the changing demands.
The North West criminal hub has a central role
in the network of the main EU criminal hubs. As
is the case with the trade in many legal goods
the geographical centre is the Netherlands and,
to a lesser but however significant degree,
Belgium. Criminals and OC groups from the UK,
Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands have tradi-
tionally defined the markets and supplied the
commodities in this criminal hub. They are
nowadays increasingly challenged and comple-
mented on different logistical levels by West and
North African, East European, Turkish, Pakistani,
Vietnamese, Chinese and Colombian groups
which in many cases can also be comprised of
second generation members residing in the EU
MS.
The indigenous criminal groups (such as the UK
and Irish groups) have traditionally procured
goods from the North West and the South West
hubs. They also establish contacts with groups
in the supplying countries in order to directly
source the goods and reduce the amount of go-
betweens and thus increase the profit margins
in the relatively competitive and efficient crimi-
nal markets of the North West Europe. For exam-
ple, Irish criminals are cutting out the estab-
lished drugs wholesalers in the Netherlands and
Spain and establishing business contacts in the
origin with the aim of procuring drugs from the
supplying groups in Colombia.
Turkish criminal groups seem to continue con-
trolling the trafficking of heroin to the EU.
Suspects of Turkish ethnicity or having contacts
with Turkish trafficking groups dominate the
wholesale of the heroin through the
Netherlands. Moroccan criminal groups move
cannabis products from Morocco through Spain
to the North West criminal hub for redistribution
in the EU. The same routes are also becoming
popular for the importation of cocaine into the
EU. Indoor cultivation of cannabis seems to be
on the increase and can affect the market in
cannabis products. It is also linked to facilitation
of illegal immigration or trafficking in human
beings: illegal Vietnamese and Chinese immi-
grants or Bulgarian victims of trafficking trying
to pay for their transportation and upkeep are
used for tending the cannabis plantations.
Despite certain attempts to procure drugs
directly from the origin, the role of the North
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West criminal hub as the distribution centre for
heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs and cannabis
products remains. The hub is influenced and fed
in particular by the South West criminal hub
(including Morocco) directing cocaine and
cannabis products, and by the flow of heroin
reaching the Netherlands through Turkey and
the Balkans. Its influence extends to the UK,
Ireland, France, Spain, Germany and the Baltic
and Scandinavian countries. Synthetic drugs
produced in the Netherlands and Belgium are
trafficked to North America, Israel and Australia
as well as to the Middle East and Asian markets,
sometimes in exchange for heroin. Precursors
for the production of synthetic drugs in the
North West criminal hub are procured from both
China and the Russian Federation.
In the North West criminal hub the UK specifi-
cally acts as a considerable pull factor for legal
and illegal forms of immigration. Certain loca-
tions in South East Asia, the Balkans and Turkey,
the FSU and North Africa act as feeders where
migrants arriving through various routes con-
gregate and where deals on their facilitation are
struck. From there they are directed by air, sea or
land to Greece, Belgium, Italy and France and in
many cases, especially via the Channel ports, fur-
ther to the UK.
The North West criminal hub seems to be influ-
enced by a feeder possibly located in the Middle
East, more specifically formed around Dubai. In
addition to being an important transit and stor-
age area for illegal commodities (for example
counterfeit cigarettes and other counterfeit
products mainly from the Far East), its role in the
international opiate trade appears central.
Dubai is a key financial and business centre but
also a logistic hub where criminal groups make
contacts and deals, launder the proceeds of
criminal activities and regulate shipments to the
distribution hubs or destination markets.
Current intelligence indicates a growing role for
Pakistan in the international trade in opiates.
Since a significant amount of heroin for the Irish
and UK markets is already directly sourced from
Pakistan, this development may intensify the
country’s role as a feeder not only for the British
Isles but possibly also for the overall European
market.
The North East criminal hub in and around the
Baltic countries is confirmed by the data con-
tributed to the 2009 OCTA. The North West hub
acting as a central distribution centre in the EU
influences this particular hub especially in rela-
tion to cannabis products originating from
Morocco and transiting through Spain as well as
to a certain extent in synthetic drugs and hero-
in. The role and international operations of
Lithuanian and other Baltic groups in the hub
means that commodities from afar touch on the
region and can be re-directed for the local mar-
kets even though their main destination may be
elsewhere, such as Western Europe or the
Russian Federation.
The Lithuanian OC groups have a central role in
the North East criminal hub even though their
main influence extends to markets and criminal
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hubs further away. They act as dealers and bro-
kers for various types of commodities in the EU
and beyond: they procure and traffic in
cannabis products, cocaine, synthetic drugs and
their precursors, heroin, counterfeit goods and
Euro counterfeits, stolen vehicles and other
stolen property, cigarettes, arms, illegal immi-
grants and women for sexual exploitation and
forward these to the relevant markets.
Lithuanian groups re-direct and traffic com-
modities from the east towards the west
(women for sexual exploitation, illegal immi-
grants, cigarettes, counterfeit goods, synthetic
drugs precursors and heroin) but also vice versa
(cocaine and cannabis products). Furthermore,
they traffic synthetic drugs from the North West
hub to the Nordic markets where also amphet-
amine and especially methamphetamine pro-
duced in Lithuania prevail. They are also intro-
ducing methamphetamine originating from
Lithuania to the Irish market.
Lithuanian groups co-operate or deal with
Russian and Belarusian as well as certain
Estonian, Latvian and Polish OC groups. The lat-
ter act as “bridging groups” who procure com-
modities from or through the Lithuanian OC
groups and collaborate in turn with local crimi-
nal groups, including those with outlaw motor-
cycle gangs (OMCG) members, for ultimate dis-
tribution in the appropriate criminal markets.
Furthermore, groups originating from Vietnam,
the Balkans and West Africa are active in the ulti-
mate distribution of drugs in the Nordic mar-
kets, either in co-operation with other groups or
seemingly independently. The local distribution
set-up varies between the Nordic countries:
Finland is influenced mainly by co-operation
patterns between Russian and Estonian groups
and OCGs with OMCG members, while the
impact of groups originating from the Balkans is
more relevant although not exclusive to
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The impact of a
criminal phenomenon familiar to Central
Europe, namely the involvement of Vietnamese
groups in domestic cannabis cultivation and dis-
tribution, is most relevant to Norway and
Denmark.
St. Petersburg is an important logistical nexus in
the North East criminal hub. It gathers various
commodities that are then re-directed to the
Russian, Nordic, Baltic and Western European
markets. Cocaine arrives directly from South
America or is re-routed via South Africa and
sometimes the Baltic States to St Petersburg,
from where it is forwarded to the markets of the
North East. Smuggled cigarettes from Kalinin-
grad are passed on via St Petersburg to the
Baltic countries and further to the EU destina-
tion markets. Illegal immigrants from the Far
and Middle East, the FSU, Colombia and
Pakistan gather at this final transit point to be
facilitated into the EU. Counterfeit goods are
shipped from St Petersburg to Lithuania and
sometimes further to Latvia, Poland and
Germany. Kaliningrad seems to have a similar
but more limited role especially in relation to
cigarette smuggling and the importation of
heroin into the EU.
The borders between the Russian Federa-
tion/the FSU and the EU are an important factor
creating certain dynamics essential for the
functioning of the North East criminal hub.
Russian OC groups are interested in using
banks located in the Nordic and Baltic countries
for laundering criminal money derived from
crime perpetrated in the Russian Federa-
tion/the FSU and probably for a less suspicious
and low-profile entry into the financial systems
in the EU. The high volumes of trade crossing
the region create opportunities that both
white-collar and organised crime can exploit
(smuggling activities, money laundering, VAT
fraud, double-invoicing, etc).
Possible changes in taxation may change cer-
tain dynamics of the North East criminal hub.
Mainly due to significant alcohol tax cuts in
Finland the market in smuggled alcohol is cur-
rently mostly relevant to Sweden and Norway.
However, some countries of the region are plan-
ning or already introducing increases in relevant
taxes. This might lead to the re-activation of an
important black market and increased opportu-
nities for criminal groups already involved in the
smuggling of cigarettes and/or alcohol such as
certain Polish, Baltic and Russian OC groups.
The South East criminal hub is based on its
geographical location between Asia and Europe
and hinges on its role as an important gateway
into the EU. Logistically the importance of the
Black Sea and the related waterways define the
hub and create opportunities for both legal
trade and organised crime.
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The significance of the port of Constanta in the
growing cocaine traffic is strengthening, and
cocaine seems to be increasingly arriving in the
EU through Turkey and/or the Balkans. This may
be due to the increased involvement of Turkish
and ethnic Albanian groups in the cocaine dis-
tribution chain but can also be the effect of the
already well-established role of West Africa as a
transit zone: this will lead to more law enforce-
ment attention to the relevant routes entering
the EU from West Africa and will conversely
increase the importance of alternative routes
and entry points into the EU.
Romania can be seen as a significant gateway
for the facilitation of illegal immigration into the
EU while the role of Bulgaria in certain criminal
markets such as synthetic drugs, counterfeit
Euros and payment card fraud is also central.
Illegal immigrants arriving from the east (the
FSU, the Indian sub-continent, Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan and China) through various routes
are smuggled into the EU via Romania, often
facilitated by Romanian OC groups. The role of
Romania as an entry point to the EU has grown
since its membership in the EU. International
transportation companies based in Romania
appear also to facilitate this highly lucrative
activity by establishing contacts with falsifiers
and recruiters from countries such as Moldova,
the Ukraine or different Asian countries
(Pakistan, India and Bangladesh).
The South East is a very active criminal hub both
producing various commodities and acting as a
busy transit, warehousing and re-packaging
zone. There are at least three main feeders and
relevant routes directly influencing the South
East criminal hub:
■ North: the Ukraine and Moldova 
Origin and transit point for illegal immi-
grants/victims of trafficking and cigarettes.
The Ukraine is also a transit point for heroin
through the Northern route into the EU.
According to some sources the overall
importance of the Northern route in the
import of heroin into the EU is growing.
■ Centre (the Balkans): Albania, Kosovo/Serbia,
Montenegro and FYROM 
Origin and/or transit point for cannabis
products, illegal immigrants/victims of traf-
ficking, heroin, cocaine, cigarettes, synthetic
drugs and precursors, counterfeit Euros and
arms into the EU.
■ South: Turkey 
Trafficking of heroin and transit point for ille-
gal immigrants into the EU; heroin
exchanged for synthetic drugs, precursors
and cocaine to be trafficked towards the
Middle East markets.
Trafficking in heroin is a main criminal market
affecting the South East criminal hub. Heroin is
trafficked from or through Turkey by Turkish
groups, often in co-operation with Bulgarian OC
groups, via the Balkan route into the EU. This
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heroin is further directed to the North West
criminal hub for secondary distribution con-
trolled mainly from the Netherlands. Regional
distribution in South East Europe seems howev-
er still to be in the hands of ethnic Albanian
groups, with Albania serving as a pre-gathering
and transport centre for the distribution of
heroin into the EU.
The emergence and strengthening of the Near
and Middle East drug markets especially in rela-
tion to cocaine, synthetic drugs and precursors
for heroin are strongly impacting the dynamics
of the criminal hub. In this sense the key strate-
gic role of Turkish OC groups who exchange, for
different markets, heroin for cocaine, cannabis
products, certain precursors and synthetic drugs
will grow. The same applies to Bulgarian and
Serbian OC groups who have a key role in traf-
ficking synthetic drugs produced in these coun-
tries towards the East. Partly through the Turkish
connection the South East criminal hub may
expand its influence towards the Middle East
and certain parts of Asia (for example Syria,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Georgia and
Armenia).
The South East criminal hub is a key entry point
to the EU for both counterfeit and genuine
smuggled cigarettes. These cigarettes originate
from illegal production in the Ukraine and
Moldova, the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, FYROM and Montenegro), and the
Far East. Legally produced cigarettes originating
from the region are re-diverted to the black
markets.
The Southern criminal hub is established
around the geographical position of Italy as
one of the gateways into the EU and the cen-
tral role of Italian OC groups with contacts in
many countries and regions all over the world.
All main Italian OC groups are again active in
drug trafficking while they are in some cases
challenged by, but in general co-operating
with, ethnic Albanian, Colombian, Turkish and
African criminals. An important feature con-
tributing to the central role of Italian OC
groups is their ability to establish contacts
with the source of drugs or other commodities
to procure them directly from there. It seems
that this is still an ability and readiness that
most groups wishing to participate in the
various drug markets cannot match and will
therefore remain dependent on these procur-
ing groups.
The influence of the Southern hub is mostly felt
in the criminal markets of trafficking of cocaine
and cannabis products, illegal immigration,
smuggling of counterfeit goods and genuine
and counterfeit cigarettes, and the production
and distribution of counterfeit Euros.
The connection with the South West criminal
hub appears still to be valid for Italian OC in the
cocaine trade. While the majority of cocaine
arrives in Italy by sea and air directly from the
source, it is also to a significant degree forward-
ed through Portugal, to a certain degree
through France, and especially through
Germany where Italian OC has a solid foothold.
‘Ndrangheta, the main Italian OC group involved
in the cocaine trade with direct contacts with
Colombian cocaine cartels, has one of its key
logistical bases in Spain. Furthermore, French OC
groups have established contact with Italian OC
groups to import cocaine into Europe, and
Italian members feature in the criminal organi-
sations involved in cocaine trafficking in
Portugal. Cannabis products are directed from
North Africa through Spain and/or France to
Italy. Due to law enforcement activities target-
ing the main trafficking route there are indica-
tions of cannabis products arriving directly from
Morocco to Italy      
The South East criminal hub also impacts
strongly upon the Southern hub. The links
between Albania, the Kosovo region and Italy
remain strong in trafficking in human beings,
heroin, cannabis products and increasingly also
cocaine while Romania is an important gateway
for illegal immigration from the FSU and China
either destined for or transiting Italy.
Furthermore Nigerian criminals residing in
Bulgaria have contacts with Nigerian OC groups
in Italy providing them with cocaine for the
Italian market.
The role of the Southern criminal hub is even
more central in relation to cigarette smuggling,
the smuggling and distribution of counterfeit
products and the production of counterfeit
Euros. Euros in this case are produced in Italy, dis-
tributed there and further transferred to other
euro zone countries such as Belgium, Spain,
Germany and Slovenia but also to countries that
OCTA
2009
32
are still outside the zone such as Hungary and
Morocco. Camorra often controls their produc-
tion, or at any rate permits the counterfeiting
activities of other criminal players. Concerning
the distribution of counterfeit Euros, there are
indications that Lithuanian distribution net-
works have been flexible enough to find new
suppliers for counterfeit banknotes after the dis-
mantling of the main printshops in Lithuania.
Both Camorra and Apulian OC groups have
established extensive contact with Chinese OC
in order to produce, transport and distribute
counterfeit products. Counterfeits are in the
majority of cases produced in China and other
parts of the Far East, but the Mediterranean
countries are also a noteworthy origin.
Components from the Far East enter the EU at
the weakest border crossing points and are
often only assembled and provided with coun-
terfeit trademarks there. This is done most prob-
ably to decrease the risk of penalties in case the
goods are intercepted on their way: at this point
in transit they are still ordinary goods and do
not abuse any intellectual property rights. Trade
flows from China have steadily increased in the
port of Naples which is also a hub for flows of
Chinese counterfeit goods. They are subse-
quently distributed to the other EU countries to
be sold door-to-door or by various vendors and
even wholesalers.
Italian OC co-operates with foreign criminal
groups to smuggle both genuine and counter-
feit cigarettes to the EU and Italy, and the latter’s
overall position as one of the gateways of smug-
gled cigarettes into the EU seems to be
strengthening. Currently around half of all ciga-
rettes seized in Italy are counterfeits and there
are indications that Chinese counterfeit goods,
and especially counterfeit cigarettes, are cur-
rently being introduced relatively aggressively
into the EU markets.
The routing of cigarettes is often a complex
process which abuses the free movement of
goods in the EU and changes constantly. In any
case, Greece, Dubai, China and Poland/East
Europe play important roles in supplying ciga-
rettes either for the Italian market or through
Italy to the other EU countries. These countries
do not necessarily produce the cigarettes but
are rather used as transit points towards the
north of Europe. Community customs proce-
dures can be extensively abused for criminal
ends: cigarettes may be imported into the EU
and placed in Community transit (VAT to be paid
only in the destination country); after this the
transit procedure may be changed into export
procedure so that the cover load (often consist-
ing of low-value goods such as counterfeit prod-
ucts) is exported but the counterfeit cigarettes
stay in the EU; alternatively the cigarettes may
be legally exported and then smuggled back
into the EU and re-directed to the relevant black
markets.
The South West criminal hub is traditionally
formed around the Iberian Peninsula and its role
as a south-west gateway into the EU. West and
North West Africa as well as other parts of the
continent have emerged as significant feeders
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either for the South West criminal hub or, increas-
ingly, directly to the important markets and dis-
tribution centres in the Netherlands, France and
elsewhere. The impact of the hub is felt especial-
ly in the criminal markets of cocaine, cannabis
products, trafficking in human beings and illegal
immigration. Accordingly, Spain remains an
important primary distribution centre for certain
parts of the EU in these criminal markets.
West Africa has a strategically significant posi-
tion in the logistical chain between South
America, the source of cocaine and the EU, one
of the major destination markets. This is in turn
consolidated by an increasing flow of legal
goods between West Africa and the EU, the
establishment of important drug trafficking
groups in West Africa as well as transactions
between the Colombian OC groups, the main
suppliers of cocaine, and West African OC
groups who are also involved in final distribu-
tion in the EU. In addition to this West Africa has
a role to play as a transit area for trafficking of
heroin into the EU.
There are increasing indications that Colombian
cartels are using West and Central Africa not
only for trans-shipment of cocaine but also for
its processing and trading. Furthermore, certain
synthetic drug precursors (ephedrine and pseu-
doephedrine) originating from Asia are increas-
ingly re-routed through central African coun-
tries to Mexico, where Mexican drug syndicates
produce methamphetamine especially for the
US market.The reported wide-spread corruption
and inability of local law enforcement to tackle
the drug trade, let alone identify and prevent
precursors for the processing of cocaine and
synthetic drugs from passing through or to the
region, suggest that the abuse of West and
Central Africa in the international drug business
will both increase, expand (comprise new coun-
tries) and deepen (not only storage and transit
but also processing, trading and/or production).
The decreasing margin for coca cultivation in
Colombia and South America also points
towards this development.
The possible criminal infiltration within Chinese
communities in central parts of Africa can fur-
ther facilitate the links between Africa and the
trade in methamphetamine: China is a main
source of precursors for the production of syn-
thetic drugs in Europe but there are also indica-
tions of Chinese ethnic minority suspects being
involved in ecstasy and amphetamine produc-
tion in the Netherlands, as well as reported
large-scale production of synthetic drugs in
China. It can be suggested that Chinese crimi-
nals can increasingly exploit Africa in the crimi-
nal market of synthetic drugs, but also in rela-
tion to counterfeit goods.
The traditional route for importing cannabis
products from Morocco, part of the North
African feeder, to the EU and especially to the
primary distribution centre in Spain is now alter-
natively, or together with cannabis, used for the
trafficking of cocaine from West Africa to the EU.
Furthermore, the Southern and South West
criminal hubs are both influenced by the re-acti-
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vation of a smuggling route passing through
Libya and Algeria to Spain, Malta and Italy. Libya
and Tripoli in particular acts as a feeder for the
above-mentioned EU criminal hubs. Criminal
organisations based in the country are involved
in the facilitation of illegal immigration and traf-
ficking of human beings across the
Mediterranean, and recently the use of the route
has diversified to include the smuggling of
cocaine and even heroin into the EU.
4.2 The interchange
between the criminal
hubs 
The factors affecting the development of the
criminal hubs in the EU are mainly the changing
patterns of supply and demand in the EU as well
as in the neighbouring regions. The North East
criminal hub for example is supplied by the
Russian Federation, Belarus and the Ukraine,
from or through which almost any commodity
can be sourced. The most competitive OC
groups such as the Lithuanian ones have their
finger on the pulse of the criminal markets and
can quickly adapt to new products that are in
demand and, on the other hand, discard criminal
markets which are declining.
A good example is the market for cocaine, which
is contracting in the US but growing in the EU
and the Russian Federation/the FSU. This may
mean that the processing of cocaine will in the
future be moved closer to these markets which
in turn can suggest the growing importance of
Africa not only as a transit zone but increasingly
also as the trading and processing centre for this
drug of choice.
The role occupied by the Lithuanian OC groups
in the North East criminal hub is in certain sens-
es similar to the role of the Turkish OC groups
further south and especially in the South East
criminal hub. Turkey’s role as a major feeder for
the EU is further supporting the key role of
these groups. An additional factor is the market
for synthetic drugs in the Near and Middle East
for which the Turkish groups are an important
supplier. Synthetic drugs may be produced in
the region or due to its proximity facilitated by
Bulgarian experts, or the drugs may be smug-
gled from Western Europe and possibly
exchanged by Turkish groups for heroin. The
Turkish groups are using Romania and Bulgaria
as entry points for heroin into the EU, and are
co-operating with ethnic Albanian and Serbian
groups who often handle at least certain parts
of the final distribution starting from Albania
and the Kosovo region and proceeding via
Austria into Western Europe.
The co-operation patterns between Colombian,
West African and Turkish OC groups would fur-
ther support the strategic position of the last of
these as a connector between the various (drug)
markets and the relevant criminal players.
Certain Italian groups often maintain a low pro-
file but in reality influence many criminal mar-
kets in the Southern criminal hub, the EU and
beyond, either independently or through co-
operation with other OC groups. Their direct
contacts with Colombian criminal syndicates as
well as the Spanish, French and Portuguese OC
groups ensure them a powerful role in the
cocaine trade. The role of the Italian OC groups
in this market enables them to source the com-
modity directly and to use and collaborate with
other groups for further distribution in the EU.
West African and Nigerian OC groups in particu-
lar are expanding their activities in the EU. They
have established themselves in the logistical
chain of cocaine trafficked from South America
through West Africa to the EU. They have also
obtained important final distribution roles in
relation to cocaine and cannabis products
across all EU regions (for example in Finland,
Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg, Bulgaria and
Germany). Moreover, they are in many cases
exclusively responsible for the trafficking of
Nigerian victims for sexual exploitation.
Moroccan OC groups are sustaining their posi-
tion due to their ability to divert from and com-
bine trafficking in cannabis products with traf-
ficking in cocaine. The existing routes for the
smuggling of cannabis products from North
Africa mostly via Spain to the EU are also nowa-
days used for cocaine. Moroccan OC groups are
also involved in trafficking in human beings for
sexual exploitation, especially in the North West
criminal hub, and play an important role in facil-
itating heroin from the secondary distribution
centre in the Netherlands to destination mar-
kets in the EU.
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The key role of Dutch OC groups is among oth-
ers due to the links of its members to both
Turkish and Moroccan OC groups (same ethnic
background or other contacts). These links
ensure access to the source of certain drugs
(heroin, cannabis and also cocaine) and in turn
strengthen the role of the Netherlands as a sec-
ondary distribution centre. Dutch, Moroccan
and Turkish groups are together involved in the
production and further distribution in the EU of
synthetic drugs made in the Netherlands.
At the moment Chinese counterfeit cigarettes
are penetrating the EU markets, but to a differ-
ent extent and at a separate pace. The North
West and Southern criminal hubs are central to
this development: in the Netherlands over 90
per cent of seized cigarettes are counterfeits of
which the majority are of Chinese origin, and in
Italy approximately half of confiscated ciga-
rettes are counterfeits. The “edges” of the mar-
kets are only starting to feel the effect: in the
Nordic countries black market cigarettes have
traditionally been genuine but recently Chinese
counterfeit cigarettes have also been intro-
duced in these markets.
While the dynamics of criminal markets may
change relatively quickly, it is safe to suggest
that the market in certain synthetic drugs in the
Near and Middle East as well as in certain parts
of Africa is thriving. This will affect the function-
ing of the relevant EU criminal hubs: they are not
only directing commodities to the EU but are
also forwarding goods to opposite directions.
OC groups from countries producing synthetic
drugs (for example Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia)
as well as groups involved in trafficking drugs
produced elsewhere (for instance in the
Netherlands, Belgium, Poland and Lithuania) will
grow in importance. This development will
underline the impact of groups such as the
Turkish OC groups who can source certain drugs
and commodities and, if necessary, exchange
them for others.
Another issue impacting across the hubs is the
increased domestic cultivation of skunk, a high
potency form of cannabis, in various EU MS and
beyond. Cannabis factories or nurseries have
been known to employ Vietnamese or Chinese
“gardeners” who may be illegal immigrants pay-
ing off their debts to their facilitators, or victims
of trafficking in human beings for forced labour.
Vietnamese and Chinese criminal groups are
involved in the cannabis cultivation, but based
on indications of plant cutters from Eastern
Europe being exploited at cannabis factories it
is probable that criminal groups from these
countries are also active in the cultivation busi-
ness. Domestic cultivation moves the produc-
tion of the merchandise much closer to the final
markets and removes arguably the riskiest part
of drug trafficking, namely the crossing of
national borders. It can also influence prices in
the market of cannabis products and change
consumption patterns away from the mainly
Moroccan-produced hashish towards more
readily available domestically cultivated skunk.
OC can efficiently exploit societal changes. Due
to demographic and other social changes the
ageing EU societies will be in dire need for new
work forces in various areas which require hard
manual labour and are not attractive to their
own population. This can affect the patterns of
trafficking in human beings: while the trafficking
of women for sexual exploitation remains stable
there are alarming indications of trafficking for
forced labour, ranging from construction and
asphalt work to begging and labour in illegal
sectors such as drug production. This enables OC
groups to supplement certain lagging criminal
sectors by creating new ones to satisfy the
changing requirements of modern EU societies.
A future challenge for the assessment of the
threat posed by OC is the study of the feeders.
These areas, whether active forwarders of vari-
ous commodities or just transit zones passively
used and abused for the flow of illegal goods
into the EU, play a key part in the overall pat-
terns and dynamics of the EU criminal hubs.
Without the influence of these feeders the EU
hubs would not exist where they currently are,
nor would they function the way they presently
do. While the role of Central America/the
Caribbean as a transit zone or feeder seems to
be slightly decreasing, the importance of West
and North Africa as well as Africa in general is in
this respect subject to further growth. Turkey,
the Balkans, North and central parts of Africa,
certain parts of the Russian Federation (espe-
cially the port of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad),
Ukraine, Belarus, Dubai and possibly also
Moldova have an impact on the EU without
which the understanding of the EU criminal
hubs is not complete.
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5.1 OC Group typology
In this OCTA typology OCGs are classified on the
basis of the geographic location of their strate-
gic centre of interest and their capability and
intention:
■ To use systematic violence or intimidation
against local societies to ensure non-occa-
sional compliance or avoid interferences
(named VI-SO strategy);
■ To interfere with law enforcement and judi-
cial processes by means of corruptive influ-
ence (named IN-LE strategy) or violence/
intimidation (named VI-LE strategy);
■ To influence societies and economies
(named IN-SO strategy).
When an OCG does not rely on any of the above
mentioned behaviours and focuses on eluding
law enforcement attention, it is considered as
having an EL-LE profile.
The assessment of the threat will be based not
only on the strategies adopted by OCGs (EL-LE,
VI-SO, IN-LE, VI-LE or IN-SO) but also on the con-
text in which they are applied (for example, in
terms of opportunities that are exploited) with
the aim of identifying situations impacting on
all the EU or significant parts of it (the concept
of criminal hub). Consequently, it is possible that
within certain criminal hubs EL-LE OCGs emerge
as crucial, while in other EU hubs VI-SO, IN-LE, VI-
LE, IN-VI-LE, IN-SO or IN-VI-SO OCGs play the key
role.
5.2 VI-SO strategy: Violence -
Territory - Brand
OCGs struggle for profit, for power or for both.
In this context, power means a capability to
influence the behaviour of other persons and
societal groups, be those potential or actual
competitors or people not pertaining to the cri-
minal environment. Power is vital for durability.
Systematic violence to ensure non-occasional
compliance and avoid interferences can be a
crucial variable in this equation. It can arouse
law enforcement attention, but certain OCGs are
prepared to face this.
Some of these OCGs are even able to turn this
visibility into a positive factor for their durability
because visibility can also facilitate intimidation
against local populations. This intimidation
expands the body of potential victims and cre-
ates clear hindrances for law enforcement and
for the judicial process.
39
OCTA
2009
Violence/
Intimidation
Influence
Local society
Law 
enforcement
process
IN-VI-SO-LE
VI-SO
VI-SO-LE
IN-VI-SO
OCTA
2009
40
As a side-effect, high visibility prompts law
enforcement action. This risk of over-exposure is
lowered by means of the OCG brand-name.
Thanks to the latter, visibility and intimidation
are referable to an abstract entity – the OCG as
a whole – and not to individual criminals. For
these OCGs, their brand-name becomes both
the engine of their criminal activities and an
effective shield against prosecution.
Enforced authority over territory is essential for
the identity and survival of these OCGs. Such a
situation can generate clashes with other OCGs
for maintaining or expanding territorial control.
In some cases, such developments might bring
about another perverse effect: to a certain
extent, a local population might feel that this
criminal presence has some advantages,
because several other criminal phenomena do
not occur in the territory controlled by the
OCG.
The threat from this phenomenon is made
worse by the fact that it can serve to channel in
the wrong direction people who feel alienated
from mainstream society.
OCGs based in the 
EU criminal hub 
Non-EU based 
OCGs 
MS-based OCGs 
with VI-SO strategy 
MS-based OCGs 
with VI-SO strategy 
MS-based OCGs 
with VI-SO strategy 
due to the fact that a brand-name can be fran-
chised to other criminals, so increasing the
power of the overall network and extending its
territory. At the same time, the OCG accepting
affiliation to the matrix criminal organisation
increases its criminal potential. It is a win-win
situation that may steer future OC develop-
ments in the EU.
Within this context, an even worse alternative
is that concepts such as ethnicity or origin can
be distorted and exploited by dangerous crim-
inals in the process of building the above men-
tioned OCGs’ identities and brand-names, at
least in the initial phases of such a process.
When these OCGs are mainly based on a cer-
tain ethnicity or origin, they can also be facili-
tated in establishing contacts for certain crimi-
nal activities, such as drugs trafficking. It
should be noted that this phenomenon is
strictly inter-linked with the more general one
– discussed later – of OCGs trying to impose
themselves as points of reference for specific,
more vulnerable, communities.
Even if the global picture is not clear, OCGs
adopting this VI-SO strategy seem to have a ten-
dency to couple it with another strategy, be it
the VI-LE, IN-LE or IN-SO one.
Concerning future developments, these OCGs
have a significant potential for growth. The role
played by the EU criminal hubs facilitates this.
The hubs increase the importance of controlling
the destination markets. OCGs no longer need
to engage in laboriously building up complex
supply networks from other continents, because
illicit goods are already concentrated within the
hubs. This is an example of how the EU criminal
hubs may shape the OC environment not only
from the perspective of criminal activities but
also from that of OCG types.
The above mentioned growth potential is also
5.3 IN-LE and VI-LE 
strategies: manipulating
the law enforcement
process
These strategies consist in interfering signifi-
cantly with law enforcement or the judicial
process. It can be accomplished through vio-
lence (VI-LE) or corruptive influence (IN-LE).
VI-LE behaviour takes place when violence is
used against witnesses or victims not pertain-
ing to the criminal environment after they
have reported crimes to law enforcement
agencies. This behaviour shows a higher level
of confidence than cases where the OCG tries
to prevent victims or witness from contacting
police authorities. OCGs adopting the VI-SO
strategy previously illustrated are exceptions
to this remark; the reluctance of witnesses or
victims to report crimes is not solely the out-
come of specific acts of violence or threats (as
it is in the VI-LE case), but is linked to a gener-
al reputation for intimidation held by an OCG
in a local population.
VI-LE strategy also consists in aggressive behav-
iour against law enforcement or judiciary per-
sonnel. There are indications suggesting that
such behaviour tends to combine with a VI-SO
strategy or the above mentioned actions
against witnesses or jurors.
IN-LE behaviour consists in focussing on the use
of middle level corruptive influence against law
enforcement to avoid detection or any low or
middle level corruptive influence to hinder an
ongoing law enforcement or judicial process. In
some cases there are indications suggesting a
combination of IN-LE and VI-LE strategies (IN-VI-
LE strategies).
There are more indications of a tendency to
combine IN-LE and IN-SO behaviours.
5.4 IN-SO strategy:
local influence
Influence is the defining factor of the IN-SO pro-
file. It refers to the impact that the OCG can have
on the lives of a significant number of people
not pertaining to the criminal environment.
OCGs with an IN-SO profile generate wide-
spread effects on local populations by using cor-
ruptive influence on high level representatives
of national or local Public Institutions, or by infil-
trating public expenditure mechanisms or other
public decision making processes of general
interest.
In several cases, there are indications suggesting
that IN-SO behaviours may have been combined
with IN-LE or both IN-LE and VI-LE behaviours. In
some instances, it has been observed that LBS
used by the OCGs were having some influence
on the general market.
There are OCGs that are capable of adopting
both IN-SO and VI-SO strategies. Some OCGs at
the root of the Southern criminal hub are
examples of such significant threat. In these
cases, the portfolio of LBS controlled by the
OCGs also has an impact on local societies and
economies.
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Indications suggesting the presence of OCGs
with an IN-SO profile are reported in many MS,
so they can be considered an EU-wide threat.
Gathering intelligence concerning the use of
corruption or infiltration in local societies and
economies in third countries is more difficult for
EU law enforcement agencies. The available
information usually does not allow for a clear
identification of the strategies adopted outside
the EU by OCGs. Sometimes, only events that
might be interpreted as indicators of the use of
corruptive influence by OCGs, such as difficulties
in international co-operation, deficiencies in law
enforcement, poor administration, etc., can be
observed. In other cases, the use of corruption in
the EU is interpreted as an indicator of even
higher levels of corruption outside the EU. In
general, lack of information and possible misin-
terpretation are serious obstacles to a a clear
appreciation of this issue.
Bearing in mind the above mentioned hin-
drances to accurate assessments of this issue,
there is some suggestion of the adoption of IN-
SO strategies by OC based outside the EU.
5.5 IN-SO strategy: playing
the intermediary role
Influence that is implied by the existence of IN-
SO strategy may be confined to specific commu-
nities that are not integrated with the surround-
ing society. These persons are more vulnerable
to OC, and this is something on which OC capi-
talises.
Criminals may try to ascend to the role of points
of reference for these non-integrated communi-
ties, exerting pressure or providing them with
what they desperately need. Such activities can
easily bring about exploitative situations or, in
any case, a dangerous proximity to organised
crime.
Indications of this kind of IN-SO strategy are
reported, for example, with reference to immi-
grants from China. In Italy, Chinese organised
crime tends to create small areas in urban dis-
tricts in which fellow-nationals can be con-
trolled both socially and economically. In the UK,
criminals victimise fellow-nationals and also
profit from offering criminal services, such as the
transfer of migrants’ remittances to China. In
France, where there is a significant Chinese com-
munity, Chinese criminals also focus on exploit-
ing their fellow-nationals.
Repatriation of money is one of the above men-
tioned areas where a dangerous proximity can
occur. In Italy, there are cases where Nigerian
OCGs were running Internet points/phone cen-
tres that were also engaged in money transfer
activities. These represent both a meeting-point
for fellow-nationals and a way to supervise and
control remittances to Nigeria.
In general, intelligence suggesting possible
criminal pressure on the Vietnamese or other
national communities is less clear than that con-
cerning Chinese migrants.
Labour exploitation can be a factor contributing
to this IN-SO strategy.
For example, in Greece, Pakistani criminals exert
influence on the Pakistani immigrant communi-
ty through control of the labour black market. In
Greece, Kurdish criminals exert pressure over
the Kurdish immigrant community, a phenome-
non also observed in  Germany.
Pakistani and Moroccan criminals are widely
reported also by Spain in relation to labour
exploitation of their fellow-nationals. Criminals
engaged in facilitating and then illegally
employing Pakistani migrants are mentioned
also by the UK. There is no reference to any influ-
ence on the local immigrant communities, but it
is possible that dynamics similar to those appar-
ent in Greece are or will be present also in Spain
or the UK.
Other indications refer, for example, to Ukrainian
workers in the Czech Republic or Romanian
migrants in Italy or Spain. For the latter it could
be that the situation will evolve in a positive
direction because they are EU citizens, and this
should make them less vulnerable.
In general, the significant pool of illegal or non-
integrated immigrants in the EU is fertile
ground for the above mentioned dynamics. In
this context, there is potential for the establish-
ment of vicious cycles where non-integration
and exploitation by organised crime feed each
other.
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It is difficult to distinguish the above mentioned
phenomena from cases where marginalisation is
already feeding into pre-existing or new OCGs
adopting VI-SO strategies.
However, non-integration, the spread of VI-SO
criminal behaviours and these confined IN-SO
strategies appear to be interlinked phenomena
with significant impact on future OC scenarios
in the EU. The mounting world economic crisis
might favour these possible dynamics. It may
prove an additional hindrance to social integra-
tion leading to an increase in the number of
persons who feel alienated from mainstream
society.
5.6 OCG types and 
destination markets 
in Northern Europe
Scandinavian countries represent an important
destination market placed between the North-
West and the North-East criminal hubs.
Easy supply of illicit goods may be one of the
reasons for the important role played by VI-SO
OCGs in these countries . It is possible that when
the ability to ensure difficult supplies is no
longer crucial, success factors become increas-
ingly linked to the control of territory. This can
be achieved through a VI-SO strategy, which
would also explain the aforementioned threat-
ening phenomenon of the emergence of new
VI-SO OCGs in some MS.
The situation seems to be more complex with
reference to another big destination market in
proximity with a crucial criminal hub: the UK and
Ireland.
There are indications suggesting the presence
of OCGs with VI-SO or, at least, IN-LE or VI-LE
strategies, based in the UK or Ireland. At the
same time, there are also indications concerning
a significant direct impact and established pres-
ence of other types of OCGs.
Criminals based in the UK and Ireland appear to
be significantly active in the Western criminal
hubs and beyond, leading to a situation where
several OCGs can be considered as based both
in another MS or third country and in the UK or
Ireland. Logistical problems linked to supplies
from the continent together with the economic
potential of this market are possibly among the
reasons for such a situation.
In particular, British and Irish criminals engaged
in drug trafficking are active in and, at least par-
tially, based in Spain or the Netherlands.
The heroin market in the UK is ultimately heavi-
ly impacted by OCGs based in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Only 25 per cent of heroin is directly
sourced from Pakistan, however, reaching the
UK in smaller quantities by courier or fast parcel
post. Key suppliers are instead OCGs that are
reported to split their strategic centre of interest
between the UK and Turkey. Also the territories
of the Republic of Cyprus over which the
Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not
exercise effective control are an important base
for these OCGs.
There are cases where OCGs based in Latin
America establish networks in the Western part
of the EU, including the UK, in order to facilitate
onward cocaine sales. These cases appear some-
what similar to the situation reported above
concerning OCGs with multiple bases supplying
the heroin market, even though, in general, the
strategic centre of interest of OCGs supplying
cocaine seems to remain in Latin America or
West Africa.
In this context - where the role of suppliers that
are based, at least partially, outside the EU or in
EU hubs is significant - the activity of OCGs spe-
cialised in money laundering emerges. They are
based not only in the EU but also in third coun-
tries and provide specialist services that are cru-
cial to the repatriation of criminal proceeds to
where the supplying OCGs keep their strategic
interests. Similar indications emerge also with
reference to the Western criminal hubs.
5.7 OCGs types in the
Eastern European 
criminal scenarios
For a significant proportion of the OCGs based
in Romania, there are indications suggesting an
IN-SO strategy. A similar hypothesis can be
made concerning the adoption of IN-LE behav-
iours.
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IN-LE strategies seem to be crucial also with ref-
erence to the OC environment in the Slovak
Republic. This use of corruptive influence does
not appear to be limited to indigenous crimi-
nals, but appears also to involve criminals of
other nationalities, such as Ukrainians for ciga-
rette smuggling and others in relation to illegal
immigration.
There are indications suggesting the possibility
that IN-SO strategies have been adopted by
OCGs run by criminals with Albanian ethnicity or
originating from the Caucasus region. With
regard to the latter, racketeering is mentioned
as one the criminal activities.
In the Czech Republic, many OCGs seem to
choose an EL-LE strategy, but for an equally sig-
nificant part there are indications of possible IN-
LE behaviours. The latter may be adopted also
by criminals with non-EU origins, such as
Vietnam or Ukraine in relation to migrants’ ille-
gal stay and labour exploitation, or the Kosovo
region for heroin trafficking by ethnic Albanian
criminals. Concerning the IN-SO profile there are
indications referring to OCGs composed of
indigenous criminals. This appears to combine
with IN-LE behaviours.
Signs of threatening pressures applied by crimi-
nals to local immigrant communities are also
reported, in some cases in combination with the
above mentioned IN-LE behaviours .
In Hungary also, many OCGs appear to choose
an EL-LE strategy. For the majority of the remain-
der, there are indications suggesting possible
IN-SO behaviours, also combined with IN-LE or
VI-SO indications.
Of note, there are indications suggesting possi-
ble VI-SO strategy used by several OCGs report-
ed by Hungary.
In Poland also, many OCGs seem to adopt an EL-
LE strategy. In comparison with the above men-
tioned MS, indications of a possible VI-LE strate-
gy (based on violence and not on corruptive
influence) seem to emerge more often.
For a noticeable proportion of the OCGs there
are indications suggesting IN-SO strategy, most
of the time in combination with IN-LE  or IN-VI-
LE (IN-LE and VI-LE) behaviours.
All OCGs reported by Bulgaria appear to adopt
an EL-LE strategy. This outlines a peculiar situa-
tion where no IN-LE, VI-LE, VI-SO or IN-SO OCGs
are reported.
5.8 OCG types 
in the criminal hubs
Western criminal hubs
The dynamics of the South-West criminal hub
revolve around a complex combination of non-
EU based OCGs, and EL-LE or IN-SO OCGs based
in the Iberian Peninsula. Some of these EL-LE
OCGs can act as links with other criminal hubs.
The latter can even be cells of different types of
OCG based in other MS, such as IN-VI-SO OCGs
based in Italy.
Concerning drug trafficking, OCGs based in
South America or Africa are reported by
Portugal as importing cocaine or hashish.
Criminals from Latin America or Morocco tend
to associate with Spanish criminals, while OCGs
made up of West African criminals seem to be
less open in this sense.
EL-LE OCGs based in Portugal also organise
transportation from source countries through
courier methods. Portugal is also used as transit
country by OCGs based, at least partially, in
Spain or other European countries, such as Italy
and the UK.
With reference to Spain, cocaine is supplied by
OCGs based in South America, some of them
also taking care of further distribution in Spain.
A significant role in this cocaine market is also
played by EL-LE or IN-SO OCGs based in Spain
and dominated by Spanish criminals with some
South American members facilitating contact or
by EL-LE OCGs based in Spain but mainly com-
posed of South American criminals.
The above mentioned IN-SO OCGs are reported
to be in contact with OCGs based in other MS,
such as The Netherlands, France and Italy, for fur-
ther distribution. In addition, OCGs based in
Italy, the UK and, in some cases, Greece are
active in Spain for the purpose of obtaining sup-
plies.
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It is interesting to note that, in analogy with the
UK, for Spain also there are indications concern-
ing the activity of OCGs based outside the EU,
specialising in money laundering. There are also
cases of specialised OCGs based, at least partial-
ly, in other MS.
The situation concerning hashish trafficking –
the other key engine of the South-West criminal
hub – is similar. In this case, the prevailing non-
Spanish nationality is Moroccan and the source
country is Morocco.
In general, it must be stressed that it is difficult
to set the exact boundaries between a situation
where, for example, criminals based in South
America or Africa are loosely co-operating with
criminals based in the Iberian Peninsula but are
part of the same OCG, and a situation where
criminals based in South America or Africa are
closely co-operating with another OCG based in
the Iberian Peninsula.
With reference to the North West criminal hub,
in The Netherlands OCGs are often present in
multiple illegal markets simultaneously. This is
probably due to their role as crucial liaison
points between the various criminal markets
and as links in a series of transport routes, cash
flows and people. Consistently a number of
OCGs are active both in The Netherlands and in
a neighbouring country. At the same time, OCGs
which are active at the geographical cores of
other EU hubs, such as Spain and Italy, are also
active in The Netherlands.
With regard to money laundering, there are a
relatively large number of OCGs operating in
The Netherlands with suspects from outside the
EU. Nevertheless, apart from a few exceptions,
there were hardly any OCGs involved in money
laundering who were based exclusively abroad
while operating in The Netherlands. At the same
time, money laundering was the sole primary
activity for only 2 OCGs but was one of the pri-
mary activities for at least 10 per cent of all
OCGs reported by The Netherlands.
As already mentioned, there are several OCGs
based in another MS and active in the South-
West criminal hub in order to obtain supplies of
illicit goods. Available information seems to
point in the same direction with reference to the
North-West hub, so this may be identified as a
peculiarity of both Western criminal hubs. In the
Eastern and Southern criminal hubs the oppo-
site mechanism applies: OCGs based in the hubs
bring illicit provisions to OCGs based in the des-
tination markets.
Ultimately, the Western criminal hubs mecha-
nisms appear to be characterised by non-EU
based OCGs interacting with EL-LE OCGs based
in the geographical centre of the hub and, direct-
ly or through them, with OCGs based in other MS
but active also in the geographical centre of the
hub for the purpose of obtaining supplies.
This implies that the main OCGs in this scenario
will keep a low profile and focus on their lucra-
tive criminal businesses rather than engaging in
a struggle for control of territory. Visibility is for
them a matter of extreme concern.
As a corollary to this reasoning, sophisticated
money laundering activities are vitally impor-
tant. The more stringent anti-money laundering
controls are, the more these services are needed
to avoid visibility when re-investing their crimi-
nal profits. The above mentioned existence of
OCGs specialising in this activity or having it
among their primary activities supports this
assessment.
These OCGs pose a double-sided threat. Firstly,
they facilitate the growth of other OCGs - for
example OCGs with or evolving towards VI-SO
profiles - in the destination markets. Secondly, in
the MS or third countries where they are based,
they can silently evolve from an EL-LE to an IN-
SO profile in cases where they are successful in
re-investing their criminal proceeds.
Eastern criminal hubs
The North-East criminal hub is a two-way hub.
Opportunism and dynamism are its key charac-
teristics.
Basically all OCGs active in Lithuania, Latvia or
Estonia are based there. The limited potential of
these destination markets combined with the
structural and functional features of these OCGs
are the likely reasons for this.
Furthermore, this is another example of how the
Western criminal hubs can shape the illegal
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markets. There is no need for OCGs based out-
side the EU to build long logistical bridges to
reach all potential markets. They can deliver in
the Western hubs; then other OCGs based in the
relevant destination markets or, as in this case, in
other hubs will activate to take care of the next
steps in the distribution chain.
OCGs based in Latvia or Estonia seem to play a
role that is different but complementary to that
played by OCGs based in Lithuania. These differ-
ences will also be reflected in the prevalent OCG
types.
Many OCGs reported by Latvia seem to adopt an
EL-LE strategy. Nevertheless, for a significant
number of OCGs, there are indications suggest-
ing IN-LE behaviours. These EL-LE or IN-LE OCGs
seem to play a crucial intermediary role
between the Russian and the EU OC environ-
ments, lessening the need for direct contact
between the two. Geographical position and the
significant presence of Russian criminals in
these OCGs may explain this role.
When indications pointing to IN-SO strategies
emerge, OCGs based in Latvia seem to have a
more limited range of direct action towards west-
ern criminal markets, while criminals originating
outside the EU tend to play important roles.
Russian speaking criminals represent a signifi-
cant part of Estonian OC. At least with reference
to OCGs targeting other MS, a rising significance
of EL-LE OCGs can also be inferred from an
increasing shift from group-based to project-
based activities and the loose nature of their
structures.
OC environment in Lithuania appears quite dif-
ferent. It is dominated by a number of multi-
crime oriented clusters, where suggestions con-
cerning combinations of IN-SO, IN-LE, VI-LE, and
VI-SO strategies regularly emerge.
Their role in the North-East hub dynamics seems
to be crucial and based more on their capacity
for criminal presence in the Western EU. This
capability also draws on their structural and
functional profiles. Links with the Russian OC
markets are crucial and can be facilitated by
Latvian OC or go via the Kaliningrad region.
The above mentioned hypotheses put the
North-East criminal hub in an intermediate posi-
tion between the Western hubs – that can be
defined as ‘activity-based’ – and the Southern
hub – that can be defined as more ‘OCG-based’.
An understanding concerning the main types of
OCGs in Romania or Bulgaria is crucial in inter-
preting the development of a possible South
East hub.
As mentioned, a significant part of OCGs based
in Romania may have enough potential to lead
such development. The peculiar situation con-
cerning Bulgaria, which reports only EL-LE OCGs,
has been outlined above.
Nevertheless, this development may be hin-
dered by the current setup of the criminal mar-
kets. For example, the heroin market is dominat-
ed by established OCGs that, in general, are not
based in Romania or Bulgaria, and that rely on
these countries merely as transit points where
local OC may sometimes be involved, but only in
marginal tasks; there are no significant signs of
change in this respect.
In addition, Ukraine and destination markets
surrounding the South-East hub probably do
not have the same potential as Russia and the
Scandinavian or North-West European markets.
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Money laundering (ML) is the common denomi-
nator of all organised criminal activities. It is the
necessary interface between licit and illicit mar-
kets, through which profits generated by crimi-
nal activities are funnelled into the legitimate
economic sector for business investments or for
sustaining the lifestyle of OC groups’ members.
As efficient ML techniques maximise the dispos-
able share of illicit profits, OC groups tend to
invest a great deal of energy and resources in
developing varied ML methods, from the simple
and primitive purchase of gold and luxury items
to multi-layered transnational schemes of
extreme complexity and very difficult detection.
Organised criminals know no limits in devising
new techniques and in exploiting existing weak-
nesses, including the lack of scruples of some
advisors, specialists and other professionals.
Of the three phases of ML (placement, layering
and integration), placement is undoubtedly the
most risky, as it marks the passage of crime prof-
its from illicit to licit economy and requires all
controls and security features of the latter to be
overcome. Criminal proceeds inserted into the
legitimate financial market in the placement
phase are overwhelmingly in cash.
Cash is the main product from criminal activity.
Cash is anonymous and, where anti money laun-
dering regulations do not preclude it, cash is
widely accepted, easily portable, convertible,
concealable and preservable. It is the principal
and ultimate bearer instrument. Payment in
cash involves neither the identification nor
accountability of the buyer. In a world where
plastic (debit or credit card) trade transactions
are increasingly and satisfactorily used, in order
to better cover and make untraceable their illic-
it activities organised (and non-organised) crim-
inals still resort to non olens cash. But there is a
limit to the use that criminals can put to cash.
They cannot make use of it in longer term strate-
gies or extend the quality of their criminal
lifestyle; nor can they improve their status in
society or legitimise themselves with cash
derived from criminal proceeds.
Anti-money laundering regulations have forced
criminals to smuggle cash across several juris-
dictions in order to place it securely in accessi-
ble facilities. OC groups use their international
dimension to move cash to countries where
they can more readily and easily manage it.
They attempt to influence on the banking sec-
tor or exploiting legal loopholes, insufficient or
unapplied legislation or crime-friendly financial
institutions. Alternatively, OC groups invest in
cash-rich legitimate business (such as super-
markets, bars, restaurants, fashion outlets, IT and
telephone outlets, travel agencies, amusement
parks, fast foods, video rentals, car parks, and
gambling clubs), subsequently camouflaging
crime profits with and within the vast and con-
stant flow of cash generated by these legiti-
mate activities, and falsifying their accounting
accordingly.
Real estate and related activities, ranging from
construction and restoration to property invest-
ment companies, real estate agencies and the
purchase of immovables, are an economic
domain habitually used for laundering money.
For example, OC groups employ controlled con-
struction companies to restore acquired prop-
erty – often no more than mere ruins – with
crime-generated money. As soon as buildings
or estates are reconstructed to perfect condi-
tions they sell them, laundering the invested
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money and making a profit on it. That modus
operandi reflects an extremely profitable, dou-
ble-layered ML technique. In facts, a significant
amount of criminal proceeds can be used in the
reconstruction phase, purchasing building
material also on the black market and hiring
irregular workers. Such behaviour shifts on oth-
ers the burden of cash placement while split-
ting considerable amounts of illicit profits into
small fragments that are far more difficult to
detect. Then, the fully refurbished and often
prestigious end product is sold on the real
estate market for an allegedly legitimate and
well-deserved profit.
In this framework, due consideration must be
given to OC groups adopting an IN-SO strategy
confined to non-integrated communities,
which are brought to make use of both their
criminal and non-criminal services. Among the
former are – for example – underpaid, illicit
labour; black market; illegal family reunifica-
tion (with relatives to be mercilessly exploited
once arrived); gambling; prostitution; drugs
pushing and money remittances. Non-criminal
services range from ethnic shops, bars and dis-
cos to phone centres. Phone centres are fre-
quently used to run alternative remittance sys-
tems. That way, OC groups can get information
on the financial conditions of members of their
community, making it difficult to escape their
control.
In all illicit services criminal cash is – by defini-
tion – the normal currency, running in a closed
circuit totally separated from the legitimate
market of the hosting MS. The isolation of that
system is such that, theoretically, national cur-
rencies of the involved ethnicities, even shells,
necklaces or baseball cards could be used to
fuel that underground economy. However, the
high profits generated by it require that OC
groups develop refined placement skills to facil-
itate further laundering, should they wish to
expand their activities beyond their community
of reference. Increasing ML capability can there-
fore be a sign of a planned extension of inter-
ests, both criminal and geographical.
Domestic OC groups exerting an IN-SO or an IN-
VI-SO strategy are facilitated in their ML activi-
ties by their penetration into the local political,
economic and social fabric. Direct or indirect
influence on commercial or financial activities
eases the placement phase, which can even be
skipped when illegal gains are drawn from cer-
tain types of fraud or from rigged tenders. High
proficiency in ML schemes further increases the
influence of IN-SO or IN-VI-SO OC groups, allow-
ing them to inextricably intertwine their licit
and illicit activities, making the dismantlement
of the OC group a source of potential economic
and social crisis at a local level.
Among the OC groups most proficient in ML are
those based within criminal hubs and pursuing
an EL-LE strategy. There is good reason for this,
namely that one of the characteristics of a crim-
inal hub is that of receiving and distributing illic-
it goods. All foreign OC groups willing to draw
commodities from these redistributors need to
cut agreements with those domestic OC groups
which control the hub. That ideal position allows
domestic OC groups to keep a very low profile,
as they can afford to be content with their “gate-
keeper” role and live with the revenues that
such a position brings. However, in order to keep
their low profile and maintain their position,
they need to be extremely skilful in reinvesting
their profits, leaving the limelight and LEA’s
attention to more aggressive or pervasive OC
groups. Some OC groups reach such a high level
of proficiency in ML that they make it their only
criminal endeavour, serving other OC groups for
a fee. Leaders or activities of these OC groups
are located not only in the EU but also in third
countries such as Iran, Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates.
OC groups owing their high-level ML capability
to their influence on the financial sector have
the potential to escalate to an IN-SO strategy.
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7.1 OC and West Africa:
Threat Assessment
Introduction
West Africa is considered to be highly influential
in relation to the OC situation in the EU.
Morocco is a major source of cannabis for the
EU consumer markets. While cocaine enters
Europe by a number of routes, trafficking via
countries in West Africa has dramatically
increased and West Africa now acts as a key
transit zone, due to its strategic location
between the cocaine producing countries and
Europe the world’s second largest cocaine mar-
ket. Illegal immigration is regarded as a signifi-
cant and increasing problem, as countries in
West Africa are not only points of origin, but also
points of transit, for illegal immigrants from
many regions outside West Africa destined for
the EU. As regards THB for the purpose of sexu-
al exploitation, Nigerian OCGs are instrumental-
ly involved in the supply and coordination of
markets across the EU.
In this assessment, the concept of West Africa
includes: Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania,
Cape Verde, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau,
Guinea Conakry, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory
Coast, Ghana, Benin, Togo, Nigeria and
Cameroon. In analysing the OC threat in relation
to this vast geographical expanse, two areas are
identifiable as being distinct from one another in
terms of the sets of OC activities affecting them.
First, the area approximating Morocco, which
maintains its influential role as a major source
country for cannabis. For cocaine trafficking, it
principally acts as a transit zone between Sub-
Saharan Africa and Europe. As a transit zone in
the trafficking of all kinds of illegal commodities
to the Iberian Peninsula, this region has also
been highlighted in relation to the trade in pre-
cursors and counterfeit tobacco. Morocco is
also targeted as a distribution market for coun-
terfeit Euro banknotes supplied by EU OCGs
indigenous to the Southern criminal hub. THB
from Morocco is primarily organised for the pur-
pose of labour exploitation in the EU South West
region.
Second, the area approximating the Gulf of
Guinea, which currently enjoys a highly influen-
tial role as a logistics centre for cocaine from
South America destined for the European mar-
ket. It also serves as a major source in supplying
the EU regions with victims of THB for the pur-
pose of sexual exploitation. Indigenous OCGs
from this region, in particular of Nigerian origin,
maintain a position of influence within the
wider criminal landscape by interlinking OC
activities in West Africa and Europe.
Accordingly, this analysis explores these geo-
graphical areas as two separate entities; i.e., the
area approximating Morocco as a North West
African (NWA), and the area approximating the
Gulf of Guinea as a West African (WA), nucleus
of OC activity. This distinction is maintained in
the analysis of NWA OCGs and WA OCGS;
whereby the former category includes OCGs
that originate from Morocco and Western
Sahara and the latter includes OCGs that origi-
nate from the variety of countries along the
coastline between Senegal and Cameroon. In
analysing the involvement of other OCGs in rela-
tion to the West African OC situation, the con-
cept of EU OCGs includes groups based in the
MS that are dominated by members of
Moroccan origin.
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Groups in relation to West Africa
West African Organised Crime Groups 
(WA OCGs)
WA OCGs, often boasting Nigerian identities,
are notably involved in trafficking and distrib-
uting cocaine in many MS and, in isolated
instances, cannabis or heroin. Concerning
heroin, although these OCGs also manage
imports into Europe, they are predominantly
used for intra-EU trafficking. Similarly, Ghanaian
OCGs and criminals of Cameroonian, Nigerian
and Senegalese origin are used in the distribu-
tion of counterfeit Euro banknotes supplied by
indigenous OCGs from the EU Southern criminal
hub. OCGs of predominantly Nigerian and, to a
lesser extent, Ghanaian and Cameroonian origin
are also notably involved in the smuggling of
illegal immigrants and THB for sexual exploita-
tion. In the area of fraud, particularly mass-mar-
keting mail fraud, WA OCGs are operating on an
international level, with huge profits and in the
knowledge that penalties for fraud are far less
severe than for most other forms of OC such as
drug trafficking. In order to sustain and expand
on their activities in the EU, WA OCGs have
invested in legitimate business structures such
as import/export companies, phone shops, inter-
net cafés, carwashes, restaurants and hotels.
In assessing the future threat that may be asso-
ciated with WA OCGs based on the available
information and continuation of current polic-
ing practices, it is expected that the growth of
these OCGs’ influence on the OC situation in the
EU will continue in the medium term. The
increasing investment of foreign OCGs in infra-
structures for cocaine trafficking across the
entire African continent and direct shipments
from South America to the EU may result in a
long term decline in the role of WA OCGs in that
particular criminal market. However, in the
medium term, as gatekeepers for exploiting vul-
nerabilities in the WA region, local OCGs are
expected to sustain their role in international
cocaine trafficking. Without a significant reduc-
tion in the vulnerability of legitimate systems in
the West African countries, the long term threat
of WA OCGs is expected to stem from the other
OC activities they are engaged in and the sys-
tems they maintain for interlinking activities at
home and within the EU.
To this effect, the four fundamental characteris-
tics distinguishing WA OCGs are their:
■ role as gatekeepers to legitimate systems in
West Africa as a result of their local knowl-
edge and by way of their capacity to exploit
vulnerabilities, also exerting a corruptive
influence;
■ access to an informal remittance system that
is being managed by Nigerian OCGs;
■ use of an efficient transcontinental commu-
nication and info-exchange system; and,
■ capacity to produce and gain access to a
comprehensive selection of high-quality
forged or fraudulently obtained genuine
documents in West Africa and in the EU.
WA OCGs are crucial market coordinators in THB
for sexual exploitation, due to their EU-wide net-
works for moving victims from one MS to anoth-
er and for bringing in new victims from West
Africa, depending on changes in demand. Due
to the nature of information sharing between
WA OCGs and the quality of their false docu-
ments, they can continuously adapt to new
policing practices, and exploit any weaknesses
in the EU immigration systems for the facilita-
tion of illegal immigration and THB. The most
significant law enforcement challenge associat-
ed with WA OCGs relates to their propensity to
create ‘legends’ of multiple identities, whereby
the ability to fraudulently obtain genuine docu-
ments in West Africa hinders the effort to prove
the legitimacy of an avowed identity. This
capacity is exploited by WA OCGs in continuing
to expand their criminal portfolios into all kinds
of OC activities.
North West African Organised Crime Groups
(NWA OCGs)
NWA OCGs of mainly Moroccan origin control
the production and wholesale supply of
cannabis in Morocco. In markets across the EU,
NWA OCGs are also engaged in the trafficking
and distribution of cannabis as shipment and
market coordinators. They share these roles with
EU OCGs who tend to invite persons of
Moroccan origin into their ranks to gain access
to wholesale suppliers in Morocco. Counterfeit
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Euro banknotes produced by Italian OCGs from
the EU Southern criminal hub are frequently
seized n Morocco, and the role of Moroccan
OCGs in their distribution is not proven but
probable. In addition, NWA OCGs are involved in
facilitating illegal immigration, THB and, in
some instances, cocaine and heroin trafficking
through the NWA region to the EU Western
regions. In the EU South West region, they are
also participating in labour exploitation. In the
NWA region, the indigenous OCGs are support-
ing foreign OC groups to smuggle all kinds of
illegal commodities into Europe; for instance,
counterfeit tobacco and precursors.
In assessing the future threat that may be
ascribed to NWA OCGs, it is expected that these
OCGs will not significantly progress beyond the
roles they currently occupy as market coordina-
tors for cannabis, and facilitators in illegal immi-
gration and cocaine trafficking towards the EU
Southern regions. In feeding the EU Western
regions with cannabis, Moroccan OCGs demon-
strate a high degree of organisation and know-
how in maximising their profits by controlling
many of the parameters that influence this
process. However, in the majority of activities in
which they are involved, they tend to be devot-
ed to a single OC activity. for instance in THB for
labour exploitation in the EU South West region,
where NWA OCGs rely on local OCGs to carry out
the actual exploitation of workers,. In the NWA
region, they are not able to act as gatekeepers
to legitimate systems, due the fact that EU OCGs
with members of NWA origin also exert corrup-
tive influence directly in this region. In addition,
there are no indications that indigenous OCGs
are planning to widen their portfolio of OC
activities using those infrastructures set up to
sustain their present criminal markets within the
NWA region.
European Union Organised Crime Groups 
(EU OCGs)
EU OCGs are increasingly active in purchasing
cocaine in West Africa for importation into the
EU. OCGs mainly originating from the EU
Western regions are also notably involved in
the trafficking of cannabis and, in some cases,
heroin from West Africa to the EU markets.
Throughout Europe, cooperation between EU
OCGs and WA OCGs in THB for sexual exploita-
tion is widespread. In the EU South West
region, the indigenous EU OCGs cooperate
with NWA OCGs in THB for the purpose of
labour exploitation.
In assessing the future threat that may be
ascribed to EU OCGs in actively shaping the
West African OC situation, it is expected that
these OCGs will play a considerable role in influ-
encing the future of cocaine trafficking via West
Africa. In considering the increasing presence
and investment in logistic bases across many
countries in the WA region, it is apparent that
EU OCGs have committed to using this region
as a transit zone for cocaine trafficking in the
medium term. With the gradual expansion into
other countries across the entire African
Continent and the limited investments in crimi-
nal infrastructures in the NWA region for the
purpose of cocaine trafficking, EU OCGs are not
expected to contribute to an increased role for
the NWA region. And, while EU OCGs are direct-
ly exerting a corruptive influence in the area
approximating Morocco, they primarily do so
for the purpose of cannabis trafficking via the
Iberian Peninsula; an activity in which they rely
on local NWA OCGs to acquire and to store
wholesale quantities of cannabis. In line with
the development of the Balkan Route for traf-
ficking cocaine from the WA region into the EU,
the increasing involvement of EU OCGs from
the South East criminal hub in this activity is
also to be expected.
Other Organised Crime Groups (not of EU,
North West African or West African origin)
In assessing the future threat that may be
ascribed to Latin American OCGs in actively
shaping the OC situation as regards West Africa,
it is expected that these OCGs will maintain their
dominant role in using West Africa as a transit
zone for the trafficking of cocaine in the medi-
um term. They control multi-ton shipments of
cocaine from South America to the WA region
that are destined for markets across Europe. In
addition to their investment in logistic bases to
control cocaine trafficking and in legitimate
business structures to conceal their OC activities
in the WA region, Latin American OCGs are
building relationships with indigenous OCGs
that would enable them to recreate a similar
situation in the NWA region. However, with the
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variety of options available to Latin American
OCGs due to their global cocaine trafficking net-
works, it is expected that the recent increase in
policing efforts devoted to the Iberian Peninsula
will contribute to sustaining the current role of
the NWA region. To this effect, it is worth moni-
toring the development of clandestine cocaine
processing facilities in the EU and the trans-
portation of chemicals and equipment to coun-
tries in West Africa for the purpose of converting
coca into cocaine.
In addition, Russian OCGs are noted for their
involvement in trafficking cocaine from the WA
region to the EU and, in relation to transhipment
via the NWA region, the involvement of Chinese
OCGs in precursors trafficking, and of Turkish
OCGs in counterfeit tobacco or heroin traffick-
ing, have also been noted. However, more infor-
mation is required on these OCGs, before it is
possible to provide an assessment of their cur-
rent role or the future threat the may pose.
Conclusions: the threat of transit
zones and criminal hubs in West
Africa
In terms of the emerging threats associated
with cocaine trafficking via West Africa, a note-
worthy development is the use of the Balkan
Route through the Black Sea to Romania and the
Mediterranean Sea to ports in Slovenia, Croatia
and Montenegro. Trade liberalisation in the
Balkan region, its geographical position in rela-
tion to Europe, and the presence of pre-estab-
lished transnational OCG networks are strong
facilitators in this development. Smuggling via
the Balkans has long since proven to be a low-
risk route into the EU, Constanta harbour being
a major gateway to the EU, also via the Rhine-
Main-Danube corridor. Today, WA OCGs histori-
cally involved in trafficking heroin are using this
route to feed EU markets with cocaine.
Lithuanian, Bulgarian, Ukrainian and Russian
OCGs have become engaged in the trafficking of
cocaine from South America into the EU, and
captains of large vessels from the Black Sea
region are being recruited to traffic cocaine
directly from South America.. However, alliances
between indigenous OCGs from the Balkans and
Nigerian OCGs have also been formed for the
purpose of trafficking cocaine from West Africa.
In targeting the Balkan Route, OCGs can exploit
existing networks in countries such as South
Africa, Mozambique and Kenya for maritime
shipments from the WA region through the Suez
Canal, before heading towards the Black Sea.
With countries in Central Africa also linked to
cocaine smuggling, OCGs can use aircraft
departing from the WA region via transit zones
across the African continent en route to the EU
Southern regions.
In terms of developments in modus operandi
that warrant monitoring, the use of light aircraft
for trafficking cocaine and observed increase in
sophistication towards larger airframes and jet
aircraft enables OCGs to target destinations
across Europe via a series of refuelling points in
Africa. The use of light aircraft for intra-EU
cocaine shipments and of airstrips throughout
West Africa for refuelling and stockpiling en
route to the EU has already been detected. Light
aircraft such as helicopters are also used in com-
bination with ‘go-fast’ road convoys to smuggle
cannabis into the EU Western regions from the
NWA region. This activity is dominated by EU
OCGs with members of Moroccan origin who
serve as a bridge to wholesale suppliers and
couriers.
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Another noteworthy development relates to
the use of drug couriers. The global intercon-
nectivity of passenger airlines affords OCGs a
wide variety of routing options to directly tar-
get local markets throughout the EU. In
exploiting this means, OCGs are using the
method of Transit-Point-Stacking ( TPS), in
which they implement a flight plan consisting
of multiple sequential flights in an effort to
hide the initial origin of couriers. The problems
associated with TPS are compounded by the
fact that intestinal transport methods are
increasing in sophistication; with packages
that remain durable for 10-12 days and support
quantities in excess of 1.5kg. OCGs are also
moving considerable quantities of drugs in the
so-called ‘shotgun method’, in which the
attempt is made to overwhelm customs con-
trols by having multiple couriers on a single
flight; in one instance, 28 couriers were detect-
ed on the same flight. The OCGs involved in this
activity are frequently using EU citizens as drug
couriers, whilst the NWA region also represents
an intermediary target for TPS between coun-
tries in the WA region and the EU. WA OCGs,
particularly of Nigerian origin, are not only mis-
using the legitimate aviation industry to smug-
gle cocaine, but also victims of THB through
commercial airports across the EU regions.
A West African (WA) criminal hub
Today, the area approximating the Gulf of Guinea
plays an important role as a transit zone for
cocaine, a major source of victims of THB for sex-
ual exploitation, and the origin of OCGs that have
carved out a significant role for themselves with-
in the EU’s criminal landscape. For shipments to
Europe via the WA region, countries along the
entire coastline between Senegal and Cameroon
act as consolidation points or centres for com-
mand and control. Although bulk shipments
from the WA region mostly enter through the EU
South West criminal hub, cocaine is also arriving
at destinations across the EU regions by sea and
air. To a lesser extent, Togo, Benin and Nigeria are
used as transit points in the trafficking of heroin,
and Ghana is a minor source of cannabis for the
EU markets. Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana are
the main origins of illegal immigrants destined
for Europe through the EU Southern regions and
direct flights to airports across the EU. Nigeria is
a key source country in THB for sexual exploita-
tion throughout the EU regions and a coordina-
tion point for activities related to all kinds of
fraud, such as mass-marketing mail fraud, for
which countries in the EU Western regions are
both target markets and rerouting centres for tar-
gets located outside Europe.
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In assessing the future threat that may be
ascribed to the WA region, it is expected that
the activities of OCGs in the area approximating
the Gulf of Guinea will result in the further for-
mation of a WA criminal hub. In the medium
term the key drivers are the recent develop-
ments in international cocaine trafficking,
which have seen Central and West Africa steadi-
ly matching Spain and Portugal as transit areas
for cocaine from South America. As a result of
the significant investment in relationships and
the required infrastructure to sustain cocaine
trafficking via this region, its role is expected to
continuously gain in importance. In the long
term it will remain difficult to identify one spe-
cific centre of gravity for cocaine trafficking, due
to the diversification of routes across the entire
African Continent. It is expected that the WA
region will be linked to activities throughout
Africa as Nigerian OCGs, for instance, are also
active in South Africa, which is seen as a major
nucleus of West African criminal activity. Overall,
cocaine trafficking alone will not sustain the
area approximating the Gulf of Guinea as a crim-
inal hub. What will determine the future of a WA
criminal hub are the activities and capacity of
indigenous WA OCGs of mainly Nigerian origin
that have carved out a significant role for them-
selves in the criminal landscape of the EU and
WA region. To this effect, criminal clusters in the
area approximating the Gulf of Guinea feature
information bazaars for facilitating all kinds of
OC activities in relation to the EU.
The North West African (NWA) transit region
At present, the area approximating Morocco
mainly serves as a source for cannabis and vic-
tims of THB for labour exploitation, and a tran-
sit zone for trafficking cocaine and facilitating
illegal immigration, to the EU Western
regions. Morocco in particular plays an impor-
tant role as a major cannabis supplier to
European consumer markets and a transit area,
due to its geographical proximity to the Iberian
Peninsula. The majority of cannabis is still
shipped to the EU South West criminal hub,
before being distributed further to markets
throughout the EU. The Northern African Route
via the Maghreb coast and the Canary Islands
from Mauritania, Senegal or Western Sahara
remain the main embarkation points in the
facilitation of illegal immigration by boat to
the EU Southern regions. In feeding the EU
South West region, Morocco is also a key source
country in THB for labour exploitation. Those
routes originally established for illegal immi-
gration and cannabis towards Southern Europe
are also used to traffic cocaine via Morocco,
Cape Verde or Mauritania. In rerouting the sup-
ply of precursors to the EU, the role of African
countries as a springboard for shipments from
China has also been detected. The NWA region
is also used as a transit zone to feed the EU
South West regions with counterfeit tobacco
from China and, more recently, from Africa.
Morocco is also targeted in the distribution of
counterfeit Euro banknotes that are supplied
by the EU Southern criminal hub.
In assessing the future threat that may be
ascribed to the NWA region based on the avail-
able information and continuation of current
policing practices, it is not expected that the
area approximating Morocco will achieve the
status of a mature criminal hub. However, in its
role as a major source country for cannabis and
a viable option for the illegal trafficking of all
kinds of commodities in the North African tran-
sit zone, the NWA region is expected to remain a
significant threat to states throughout the EU
regions in the medium term. As a major source
country in THB for labour exploitation, Morocco
is also expected to remain a threat to states in
the EU South West region.
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7.2 Reflecting 
on the economic crisis 
The current crisis in the global economy has rel-
evance for scenarios in which OC operates.
Current lack of knowledge concerning the real
magnitude and duration of this crisis and
concerning the dynamics governing its
impact on criminal and non-criminal players
prevents accurate and reliable assessments of
its effects on the OC threat to the EU.
Although intelligence concerning these effects
is not yet available for analytical assessment, this
issue is, however, worthy of initial consideration.
Therefore, the following thoughts are proposed
as a non-exhaustive list of factors that may
provide opportunities for criminality.
A first assumption may be made with reference
to possible consequences for black markets.
Markets for counterfeit or smuggled products
may broaden, in a possible attempt by operators
to maintain levels of consumption or profit in a
situation where less purchasing power is avail-
able.
It should be taken into consideration that the
potential for this increase is also influenced by
the correlation between wealth available to
individual ‘customers’ and their demand for
certain goods. In cases where this correlation
is high, people might even reduce their con-
sumption altogether, with the result that also
the demand for OC supplied goods would at
best remain static and at worst would even
decrease.
The employment of irregular or undeclared
labour may also have a role to play. Increasing
pressure to cut costs may in turn engender
increasing pressure on entrepreneurs to employ
irregular or undeclared labour. OC can benefit
from this by providing irregular workers to oth-
erwise legal enterprises or by exploiting such
workers more directly in the production of
cheaper goods.
Concerning the flow of illegal migrants or
trafficked human beings to the EU, it is possi-
ble that the slowing pace of the EU economy
will not be matched by a proportional decrease
in movement. The effects of the crisis outside
the EU, for instance, may contribute to keep this
flow high. At the same time, the potential for the
crisis to have varied degrees of impact within
the EU may result in an increase in internal
movement that could also feed irregular labour
and exploitative situations.
If black markets and irregular or undeclared
labour are subject to growth, this will also repre-
sent an additional obstacle for law-abiding
entrepreneurs and citizens trying to recover
from the crisis, since unfair competition will
further deprive them of business.
With regard to illicit goods or services in gener-
al, if one assumes that in some cases the above
mentioned correlation between wealth and
demand is relatively low - for example, in the
drugs sector as a result of addiction – this rigid-
ity might give criminals an opportunity to
keep profits high during the crisis. By the same
token, insufficient rigidity may cause losses, but
it must also be taken into consideration that the
same or other OCGs may benefit from possible
related increases in the demand for cheaper
surrogates, for example in the sphere of recre-
ational drug supply.
In addition, there are criminal activities, such
as fraud or crimes against property in general,
where the supply/demand paradigm is not so
easily applicable. The assumption may there-
fore be made that the impact of the economic
crisis on these criminal fields will be less direct.
In general, it should also be taken into consider-
ation that some entrepreneurs struggling for
survival on the market might become victims
of OC, for example in the field of usury, the ulti-
mate aim of which is often to gain control of
legitimate businesses, thereby infiltrating the
legitimate economy. In addition, the possibility
that some entrepreneurs in serious trouble
might become more open to some sort of co-
operation with OC cannot be discarded.
Another assumption is that the economic down-
turn may increase the number of persons who
feel alienated from mainstream society and
make the continued integration of immigrants,
and marginal groups in general, more difficult.
This may afford growth potential to OCGs
adopting VI-SO strategies or to those
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attempting to establish themselves as points of
reference for non-integrated communities
(‘confined’ IN-SO strategy). Labour exploita-
tion can be a factor of the latter behaviour.
Non-integration, and the spread of VI-SO crimi-
nal behaviours and confined IN-SO strategies
would seem to be interlinked phenomena with
significant potential impact on future OC
scenarios in the EU, and the mounting global
economic crisis may favour these possible
dynamics.
OCGs at the core of the EU criminal hubs tend,
by definition, to be characterised by significant
levels of adaptability and initiative, so it can be
expected that they will be able to face the com-
ing challenges. The existence of the criminal
hubs may even prove to be a factor that will
enable other less flexible OCGs across the EU to
absorb negative impacts and to profit from new
opportunities.
In the hypothesis that OC may be able to con-
tinue to make high profits as legitimate opera-
tors experience increasing difficulties, the possi-
bility that OC may make use of this availability of
resources to try to further penetrate the legiti-
mate economy cannot be ruled out. On the
other hand, it must be taken into consideration
that many OCGs may also now be suffering
similar losses and difficulties, according to the
extent to which their assets are already integrat-
ed into the legitimate economy.
The notion of further penetration by OC as a
result of the economic crisis is very complex
and linked to so many variables that, at this
stage, any attempt to predict the final outcome
would be superficial and of limited value.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to prevent such an
eventuality by ensuring that authorities and
economic operators keep a high and ever-
increasing guard against money laundering
and reinvestment of illicit profit, and by tar-
geting investigations on identifying and con-
fiscating the assets that are accumulated by
OCGs. In this context, homogeneity in
approaches among different jurisdictions in
the EU and all over the world is crucial. In the
absence of such homogeneity certain jurisdic-
tions might naturally become the preferred tar-
gets of OC.
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